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As long as oil spills are a reality (International Maritime Organization, 2005, p. 3; Davidson 
et al., 2008; Kirby and Law, 2010) oil spill emergency response (OSER) remains an important 
policy and research topic. OSER is a complex and dynamic cross-disciplinary activity that 
unfolds in a continuously evolving and at times highly uncertain environment. The greater the 
scale of the oil spill, the larger the number of actors involved. The effectiveness of an OSER 
system is a function of the ability of these actors to work together to ensure that containment, 
clean-up and disposal activities are conducted. The need for interaction among multiple 
organizations entails unique organizational problems of interorganizational coordination.  
 
Interorganizational coordination in OSER systems is the focal point of this study. I have 
formulated the following research questions: (1) what are the basic characteristics and 
determinants of the organizational structure of an OSER system? (2) how do formal and 
informal mechanisms of interorganizational coordination provide for the effective functioning 
of an OSER system? (2a) what is the relationship between formal and informal coordination 
mechanisms? (3) how do the patterns of interdependence among organizations in OSER 
systems affect interorganizational coordination? The ultimate aim has been to study 
interorganizational coordination in oil spill response in order to shed light on whether and 
how it provides for the effective functioning of an OSER system.  
 
The analysis is based on three variables, as shown in Figure 1. OSER systems are approached 
as organizational structures where numerous organizations interact on the basis of 
interdependencies related to the nature of OSER activities. Interdependence may facilitate or 
inhibit interorganizational coordination, depending on the circumstances. Coordination in turn 
affects the effectiveness of a system. Coordination functions as an intermediate variable: on 
the one hand, it is affected by interdependence; on the other, it influences the effectiveness of 
an OSER system. I see coordination as the simultaneous interplay of formal and informal 
mechanisms, i.e. as a compound variable. Therefore the focus is not on the individual effects 












Figure 1. Variables in the study 
 
The thesis consists of two parts. Part I addresses the research project as a whole. Here I 
present the main research questions and discuss the theoretical and methodological 
approaches employed in the empirical investigation. Further, I present the main findings and 
discuss the conclusions. Part II contains the four research articles accepted for publication or 
published in various scholarly journals. I have written four articles, three as co-author. The 
articles are based on empirical data gathered in the course of studies of the OSER systems in 
Norway and the Murmansk region of Northwest Russia and a study of the bilateral 
Norwegian‒Russian cooperation on joint oil spill response in the Barents Sea.  
 
I chose to focus on Norway and Northwest Russia because of the increased risks of acute oil 
pollution in the Barents Sea. This is due to the rapid growth and projected increase of oil 
transport; and to anticipated offshore petroleum developments in the Norwegian and the 
Russian Arctic (AMAP, 2007; Arctic Council, 2009; Bambulyak & Frantzen, 2005; 2007; 
2009; Eide et al., 2007; Kirby and Law, 2010; Ramboll Barents, 2010). What makes this 
especially important is that responding to oil spills under severe Arctic conditions is 
exceptionally difficult, and irreparable damage may be done to the vulnerable marine and 
coastal environment (Arctic Council, 2009; Eide et al., 2007; Ramboll Barents, 2010).   
 
The studies in these research articles are all qualitative and are based on a case-study design. 
The data derive from interviews and textual documents. Academic knowledge on oil spill 
preparedness in Norway and Russia and on the bilateral cooperation between the two 
countries is limited. Therefore, my studies can stand as an initial research attempt to 
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investigate these topics. For this reason, much of the research effort has involved the 
empirical investigations. As the four articles share a common theme, and a similar analytical 
approach has been used, some overlaps are inevitable. In particular, articles I and II are partly 
based on the same empirical material, while articles II and III rely on a shared analytical 
approach. It should also be noted that the presentation of the material varies, due to 
differences in the formal requirements of the journals. This, however, has not affected their 
substantive content. Each of the articles represents a separate contribution to my investigation 
of the main research topic: oil spill emergency preparedness in the Barents Sea.  
 
Article I was meant to fill in the knowledge gap regarding organizational aspects of OSER in 
Northwest Russia. The article outlines the formal organizational structure of the Russian 
OSER system and examines the formal relationship between the federal and the regional 
authorities and the subsystems of the OSER system in the Murmansk region of Northwest 
Russia. My main objective was to define the roles and functions of the major public and 
private actors and their relations in the OSER system. The findings of this article indicate that 
the national OSER policy and system in Russia has not been fully developed; it lacks a clearly 
formulated state policy and a single governing authority, has no unified structure, and is 
constrained by insufficient resources. 
 
Article II explores interorganizational coordination in the OSER system in the Murmansk 
region of Russia. The OSER system is discussed as a structure based on interorganizational 
interdependencies which may both facilitate cooperative behaviour and induce competition. 
The findings indicate that the formal and informal mechanisms are in fact complementary. 
The formal coordination defines the roles and functions of the interacting organizations, 
establishing the operative coordination procedures and patterns of interaction on a daily basis. 
The informal coordination facilitates the effective functioning of the formal procedures and 
compensates for its gaps and shortcomings. Interdependence among the actors within the 
systems is based on a shared commonality of purpose. However, the commercialization of 
OSER services as a result of federal policy has led to competitive relationships, in particular 
among response providers.   
 
Article III examines the Norwegian OSER system.  The Norwegian OSER system is based on 
a unitary state policy where agreement on purpose and principles is shared among the 
participating organizations. The principle of collaboration where everyone contributes to the 
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common objective is an essential element of the culture of the OSER system. Formal 
coordination constitutes the core of the interorganizational coordination in the system. The 
informal mechanisms are synergetic in that they facilitate the effective functioning of the 
formal mechanisms of coordination. There is a continuous striving to strengthen the formal 
procedures by socializing the actors into the „duty system‟ ‒ the chain of command and 
control. Interdependence among the participants is based on a strong sense of common 
purpose, which promotes cooperative behaviour and strengthens interorganizational 
coordination.  
 
Article IV is a case study of the bilateral Norwegian‒Russian cooperation on joint oil spill 
response. The study examines the development and institutionalization of this bilateral 
regime, discussing the facilitators and inhibitors of cooperation and analysing its effectiveness 
in terms of outputs, outcomes and impacts. The findings indicate that the Norwegian‒Russian 
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„At the very core of the practice of emergency 
management is the concept of coordination‟ (Drabek, 
2007, p. 217). 
 
 
„Response to a major pollution emergency is like 
standing up, overnight, a multi-million dollar 
corporation with three (or more) partners (Unified 
Command) … The tremendous variety of entities 
(agencies, companies, organizations, individuals, etc.) 
that are partners, customers, suppliers and 
stakeholders in the business of emergency response 
have always posed huge challenges for emergency 







1.1. Background and problem  
 
Accidental marine pollution is a subject of major international concern (Garnacho et al., 
2010). In particular, oil transport at sea remains one of the major sources of risk (Ornitz and 
Champ, 2002; Håvold, 2010; Perry, 2009). Despite the substantial decrease in the number of 
large spills from tankers during recent decades due to implementation of new stricter 
regulations and better management practices (International Tanker Owners Pollution 
Federation, 2011), ship accidents are still a major input of oil pollution in the marine 
environments (GESAMP, 2007). Further preventive inputs are required (Eide et al., 2007). 
Oil transportation will continue to increase (International Energy Agency, 2010, p. 6), 
especially in the Arctic (ACIA, 2004; Arctic Council, 2009, p. 5), the area in focus in this 
project. Release of oil into the Arctic marine environment through accidental or illegal 
discharge from ships is an especially significant threat, so the highest priority should go to 
preventing oil spills, in order to protect the vulnerable Arctic environment (Arctic Council, 
2009, pp. 5, 7).  
 
Oil is a hazardous toxic substance. Major accidental oil spills in the marine environments may 
spread over vast territories, causing a wide range of negative impacts for the ecosystem 
(International Maritime Organization, 2005). Experience has shown that efficient oil spill 
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recovery at sea can be carried out during only approximately 60% of the year (Norwegian 
Coastal Administration, 2010a), and in most cases the amount of oil that can be contained 
close to the source is not more than 15% (Norwegian Coastal Administration, 2010a, p. 14). 
 
In some environments, years may be required before the damage is fully repaired, and the 
impacts of large oil spills can last for decades (International Maritime Organization, 2005; 
Webler et al., 2010)
1
. The Arctic regions are areas of special concern with respect to oil spills 
due to the extreme weather conditions, vulnerable ecosystem, poor infrastructure and other 
specific challenges associated with responding to oil spills in cold environments (AMAP, 
2007; Arctic Council, 2009; Patin, 2008). Methods for recovering spilled oil in an ice-covered 
Arctic environment are complicated and are currently limited (AMAP, 2007; Arctic Council, 
2009). Environmentalists have warned, „[w]ere it to happen again today [in the Arctic], a spill 
the size of the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster would likely prove equally as devastating‟ (WWF-
US, 2009). 
 
Oil spills are low probability but high consequence events (Harrald et al., 1990, pp. 15‒16). In 
particular, large spills are potential disaster situations (Walker et al., 1994 p. 31‒32). When a 
quick and massive response is required, no single organization has all the resources necessary 
to alleviate the effects of a disaster. A combined effort of multiple organizations is required. 
In any disaster, organizational integration becomes the most crucial dimension: „[w]hile in 
everyday affairs organizations implicitly are dependent on one another to meet routine 
problems, they are rarely called out in force to function effectively together as one unit. Yet 
this is precisely what is required in a disaster – the full mobilization and cooperation of 
interdependent organizations, which normally operate autonomously‟ (Form and Nosow, 
1958, pp. 243‒244, cited in Litwak and Hylton, 1962, p. 403).  
 
This thesis argues that good organization and effective interorganizational coordination 
among the key actors are both key prerequisites and a major challenge for successful oil spill 
emergency response (OSER). Providing effective response to oil spills requires a functioning 
organizational structure that can allow all participating organizations to work together to 
achieve unity of effort (Ott et al., 1999; Stevens and Aurand, 2008). The effectiveness of this 
                                                 
1
 The Exxon Valdez oil spill has made clear the scope of negative consequences of major spills and how 
persistent they can be. Twenty years after the spill the ecosystem has still not recovered and oil can still be found 
under rocks on the beaches of Prince William Sound (Guterman, 2009; Webler et al., 2010; WWF-US, 2009). 
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structure is a function of a combined and coordinated effort of multiple organizations (Coastal 
Response Research Center, 2006, p. 9; Stevens and Aurand, 2008; Tuler et al., 2007). 
Inability to achieve this may ultimately lead to failures in a response operation, as with the 
operation in connection with the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska on 24 March 1989 
(Harrald et al., 1992, p. 199).  
 
To define the organizational structure responsible for providing oil spill emergency response I 
have applied the term „OSER system‟ in the study.  This is a complex concept. On the one 
hand, it reflects on a pollution response preparedness system (Harrald, 1994, p. 203), which is 
an OSER system in a steady-state mode of operation. On the other hand, it reflects on the 
concept of an emergency response management system (RMS), which is an OSER system in 
an emergency mode of operation. An emergency response management system is an 
organizational subsystem created by a pollution response preparedness system in a state of 
incident and is defined as „the combination of organizational structure, management 
processes, individual roles, and operational strategy employed during an oil spill response‟ 
(Walker et al., 1994, p. 15). In the articles presented here I have not differentiated between the 
two modes of operation. A general term, „OSER system‟ has been applied, but the focus is on 
a pollution response preparedness system. The geographical focus on Norway and Northwest 
Russia makes it natural for the Norwegian and Russian OSER system to serve as the 
empirical context.  
 
In line with the definition as a „social institution consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, 
rules, procedures and programs that govern the interaction of actors in specific issue areas‟ 
(Levy et al., 1995, p. 274) I regard an individual OSER system as a regime. This allows me to 
consider an OSER system as an institution, which in turn provides an argument for using 
organization theory as the analytical framework for studying the Norwegian and Russian 
OSER systems.  
 
By studying these systems, I wish to deal with the following research questions: (1) what are 
the basic characteristics and determinants of the organizational structure of an OSER 
system? (2) how do formal and informal mechanisms of interorganizational coordination 
provide for the effective functioning of an OSER system?; (2a) what is the relationship 
between formal and informal coordination mechanisms?; (3) how do the patterns of 
6 
 
interdependence among organizations in OSER systems affect interorganizational 
coordination?   
 
1.2. Research on oil spills 
 
In this study, oil spill emergency response is seen as an integrated part of emergency 
management (McLoughlin, 1985, p. 166) and defined as „[a]ny action undertaken to prevent, 
reduce, monitor or combat oil pollution‟ (International Maritime Organization, 1995, p. 15). 
Studies of spill emergency response are part of the emergent social science literature on 
behaviour in disaster studies. This research tradition has evolved primarily in the United 
States and has concentrated on understanding and improving human responses to disaster 
events (Drabek, 1986). An initial effort to examine emergency response to disaster was made 
in 1920, when the Canadian Samuel Prince wrote the first doctoral dissertation on a disaster 
topic in social science (Drabek, 1986, p. 1). In his dissertation, he studied the convergence of 
people and supplies in response to the 1917 Halifax shipping explosion resulting from a 
collision between a French munitions vessel (the Mont Blanc) carrying trinitrotoluene and a 
Belgian relief ship near the docks of Halifax, Nova Scotia. This thesis had a massive impact 
on the investigation of the matter and laid the foundations for research on the collective 
behaviour in and organizational reactions to various types of mass emergencies in social 
science.  
 
Research on oil pollution goes back to 1930s, but until the late 1980s, the primary focus was 
on the effects of oil spills on the environment and on various live species (Battelle Memorial 
Institute, 1967) and the technical aspects of oil spill response, not organizational issues 
(Harrald, 1994, p. 204). Review of the biennial Oil Spill Conference Proceedings articles 
published during the 1970s and 1980s shows a focus on technology and resources, with only 
limited attention to organizational issues (ibid.). With respect to oil pollution emergencies it 
was in particular the Torrey Canyon (1967) incident that moved the world community to 
recognize oil spills „as a specific regulatory issue‟ (Walker et al., 1994, p. 23). The need for 





With the establishment of the Disaster Research Center by sociologists at Ohio State 
University in 1963, organizational behaviour in disaster situations entered the study focus of 
the social sciences (Drabeck and McEntire, 2003, p. 98). Research within the field has spread 
to include all phases of disaster (preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation) and system 
levels (individual, group, organizational, community, society and international), where the 
latter reflects the increased structural complexity of human systems (Drabek, 2007). The need 
for disaster studies to look into „the patterns of … interorganizational linkages, to indicate 
those factors which facilitate and those which hinder the overall development of 
interorganizational ties‟ was indicated in the late 1970s (Taylor, 1978, p. 254). Since then, 
research has examined the problem of organizing for response (Rodrígueez et al., 2007) and 
interorganizational coordination in particular (Drabek, 2007). 
 
Within the disaster literature, research on emergent phenomena has been a central topic of 
discussion (Drabeck and McEntire, 2003). Established by Quarantelli (1966) and Dynes 
(1970 cited in Drabeck and McEntire, 2003, p. 98), who developed the well-known typology 
of emergent organizations, this debate was substantially expanded in the ensuing decades.  
There has been a special focus on contrasting two models that seek to explain emergent 
phenomena: command and control vs problem-solving structure. At the core of the debate is 
the criticism of the traditional command and control approach (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976; 
Britton, 1989, p. 28; Harrald et al., 1992, p. 214; Walker et al., 1994, p. 42; Dynes, 1994; Neal 
and Phillips, 1995, p. 335; Weller, 1997).  
 
The command and control mode is common in emergency management in general (Schneider, 
1992), and in OSER management in particular (Walker et al., 1994, p. 25). Rooted in 
paramilitary approaches to handling crisis situations (Dynes, 1994), the command and control 
approach is based on „clearly defined objectives, division of labour, a formal structure, and a 
set of policies and procedures‟ (Schneider, 1992, p. 138) and is therefore rigid and highly 
centralized (Britton, 1989; Dynes, 1994; Neal and Phillips, 1995, p. 327). As a rule, such a 
form of organization is more effective in stable, predictable environments (Neal and Phillips, 
1995, p. 329). However, the environment of most emergencies, oil spills not least, is often 
chaotic and unpredictable, so a rigid and highly centralized form of management may prove 
ill-suited (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976; Britton, 1989, p. 28; Harrald et al., 1992, p. 214; 
Walker et al., 1994, p. 42; Dynes, 1994; Neal and Phillips, 1995, p. 335; Weller, 1997). More 
flexible approaches (Walker et al., 1994) and forms of coordination (Dynes and Quarantelli, 
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1976) are often needed. As Walker et al. (1994) have argued, to be effective in a highly 
turbulent environment, an OSER system has to be dynamic and adaptive, capable of adjusting 
its size, complexity and functionality to meet the needs of the situation.  
 
The emerging research field received greater impetus in the wake of the major incidents of the 
following years, which indicated new issues and challenges. The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill 
in Alaska is the disaster most frequently referred to, because it changed attitudes to oil spill 
planning and response within the USA and globally (Walker et al., 1994, p. 19; see also 
Harrald, et al., 1990; Harrald, 1994; Weller, 1997; Walker et al., 1994; Ornitz and Champ, 
2002). Research began to look into how to improve the ability to organize oil spill response 
and establish an effective response management system. Among the subjects in need of 
further study, interorganizational coordination has been indicated (Coastal Response Research 
Center, 2006, p. 27). 
 
This thesis contributes to the organizational, social studies of oil spill emergency response and 
therefore belongs to the field of hazard and disaster studies within the social sciences. My aim 
is to contribute to our understanding of organizational behaviour and the processes of 
interorganizational coordination in OSER systems. The four articles that make up the body of 
this dissertation do not study particular emergency situations. Although I look at how an 
emergency may affect OSER systems in terms of structural changes, the main focus is on the 
steady-state mode of operation of OSER systems (see Walker et al., 1994, p. 16). The 
multiplicity of actors and functions within OSER systems makes it impossible to include them 
all. Therefore, this study is limited to the analysis of the key actors and their mandates. It is 
not my objective to discuss the physical or technical aspects of OSER activities. The choice of 
literature has centred on work ‒ conference papers and research articles in particular ‒ dealing 
with the organizational aspects and effectiveness of OSER. In addition, I have analysed 
general literature on disaster management and emergency planning that is not specifically 
related to oil spill response, in order to understand the conceptual origins of the organizational 
arrangements used in responding to emergencies. This literature was especially relevant as 
regards the role of informal coordination mechanisms in OSER systems that (as this study 




1.3. Research purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to organizational studies of oil spills. The subject of 
interorganizational coordination which brings together the organizational entities in oil spill 
response has been pointed out as a specific research need (Coastal Response Research Center, 
2006, p. 27). In this study, I examine how interorganizational coordination affects the 
effective functioning of an OSER system. The intention is to see how interorganizational 
coordination is established through formal and informal mechanisms in the Norwegian and 
Russian OSER systems and whether these mechanisms act complementarily and create 
synergies, or are non-compatible and in competition with each other. I examine the nature of 
interdependence among organizations within the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems and 
between the two systems in order to identify the incentives this creates for organizational 
behaviour in terms of coordination. And finally, I seek to define the characteristics and 
determinants of organizational structure in OSER systems and see how the components of the 
structure are interconnected.   
 
Empirically, this thesis contributes to knowledge on oil spill emergency preparedness in the 
Barents Sea, specifically in Norway and Northwest Russia. I look into the organizational 
aspects, patterns of interorganizational coordination and effectiveness of the Norwegian and 
Russian OSER systems.  
 
In terms of theory, I test the applicability of the analytical approaches to interorganizational 
coordination to the investigation of coordination in OSER systems. On the basis of the 
findings presented in the articles, I offer some reflections in chapter 5 on the OSER systems 
discussed in the articles in terms of organizational theory. In order to do this, I apply 
Mintzberg‟s theory on structuring of organizations (Mintzberg, 1983). The analytical 
propositions for this discussion are introduced in section 2.2 and applied in chapter 5.  
 
Some words are in order about the limitations in the study. Given the wide range of tasks 
performed by an OSER system, it would have been impossible to focus on all of them within 
the scope of one thesis. My research has been delimited to the study of organizational aspects 
of OSER. I have concentrated on the legal aspects of OSER since they define the system; 
contingency planning as a means of providing coordinated and combined responses to oil 
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pollution incidents; and operational response, which is related to what actually happens in a 
situation of acute oil pollution and to some extent control. This focus on a specific aspect of 
OSER means that I have not sought to provide a comprehensive picture of this activity in its 
entirety. As this thesis has in many ways been an initial research effort to investigate oil spill 
emergency preparedness in Norway and Russia, it can be seen as a first step for more 
complex investigations in the future.  
 
Issues related to data collection are discussed in section 3.6.  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
 
The thesis consists of two parts that should be seen as one coherent document. In Part I, I 
begin by presenting the background and research purpose of the study, discussing the 
analytical framework and my choices of methodology. In chapter 2, I discuss how the 
research topic was approached analytically and outline the key elements of the framework 
applied in seeking answers to the research questions. After discussing the complexity of oil 
spill response, I present an OSER system as the unit of analysis for this the study. Then I go 
on to examine an OSER through the lenses of Mintzberg‟s analytical approach to 
understanding the structuring of organizations, and develop an abstract model of an OSER 
system using his structural model. I further discuss the analytical propositions concerning the 
analysis of interorganizational coordination, interdependence and effectiveness of OSER 
systems. These sections provide the basis for the main research questions and analytical 
implications for the study. In chapter 3, I explain the choices in methodology and the 
collection of empirical data, especially the use of interviews and textual analysis. Towards the 
end of chapter 3 I comment on the quality of the study. In chapter 4, I present and summarize 
the main findings, which are then discussed in chapter 5. The overall conclusions of the study 
are presented in chapter 6.  
 
Part II consists of the four articles. Each provides in-depth analysis and discussion of the 
specific research questions that, taken together, contribute to answering the main research 
questions. The four articles are complementary, as they all deal with various aspects of the 





The articles are as follows: 
 
Article I: Ivanova, M., 2011. Oil spill emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic: a 
study of the Murmansk region, Polar Research, 30, 7285, DOI: 10.3402/polar.v30i0.7285.  
 
Article II: Ivanova, M. and Sydnes, A.K., 2010. Interorganizational coordination in oil 
spill emergency response: a case study of the Murmansk region of Northwest Russia, Polar 
Geography, 33 (3), pp. 139‒164. 
 
Article III: Sydnes, M. and Sydnes, A.K., 2011. Oil spill emergency response in Norway: 
coordinating interorganizational complexity, Polar Geography, 34 (4), pp. 299-329. 
 
Article IV: Sydnes, M. and Sydnes, A.K. The Norwegian‒Russian oil spill response 
regime in the Barents Sea: an untold story of success. In: E. Røsæg & A. Proelss, eds. Safety 
in the North. Studies in international law of the sea and maritime law series. Baden-Baden : 


















































































This chapter presents and argues the analytical framework within which I seek to answer the 
main research questions. I outline the key points of the framework and discuss their analytical 
implications for the analysis. To summarize my analytical approaches, I have made a figure 
that shows the logical correlation between the main concepts examined in the study (figure 1).  
The study is based on three variables. One dependent variable is the effectiveness of an OSER 
system that is a function of interorganizational coordination. Coordination among individual 
organizations in an OSER system is another dependent variable, as it is subject to 
interorganizational interdependence. Consequently, the independent variable in the study is 
interdependence among the individual organizations in an OSER system. I return to the main 











Figure 1. The variables in the study  
 
I start this chapter by discussing the OSER system, the unit of analysis. In the articles, the 
OSER systems and their organizational aspects are treated primarily as empirical phenomena. 
To illustrate OSER systems and reflect on the empirical findings in terms of organization 
theory, I apply Mintzberg‟s understanding of the structuring of organizations; in section 2.2, I 
create a model of an „ideal‟ OSER system using Mintzberg‟s organizational core elements 
(Mintzberg, 1983). The „ideal‟ model provides a tool for illustrating and discussing the 
organizational structures of OSER systems. I return to the model in section 5.4. to deliberate 
on the structure of the Norwegian and Russian OSER system to generalize on the empirical 
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findings in terms of theory. Mintzberg‟s approach has a focus on intraorganizational 
processes, whereas I apply it in this study to examine interorganizational relations. This will 
entail certain limitations, as regards the discussion of coordination mechanisms in particular.  
 
Interorganizational coordination and interdependence are examined in articles II and III. Both 
studies are based on analytical approaches to interorganizational coordination.  In sections 2.3 
and 2.4., I elaborate on the discussion of the analytical framework presented in the articles.  
 
2.1. OSER system as a unit of analysis: complexity of oil spill response  
 
Oil spill emergency response (OSER) is a complex and dynamic cross-disciplinary activity 
that unfolds under conditions of uncertainty and requires quick decisions and action (Ornitz 
and Champ, 2002; Tuler et al., 2007). Preparedness for oil spills is therefore challenging 
(Taylor, 2008, p. 7). The complexity of OSER activities is due to the wide range of functions 
and tasks that are involved to ensure a thorough and sound programme for responding to oil 
spills (see Table 1; Taylor, 2008, p. 7). My articles II and III identify a large number of 
organizations that may be needed in an emergency situation. This implies that OSER systems 
are multi-organizational and that the individual tasks and functions need to be integrated.  
 
There is no single, agreed definition of OSER system in the literature, so the concept requires 
clarification. Here I take as my point of departure the nature of OSER as a special type of 
activity. As oil spills are accidents, OSER is conducted in two modes: normal mode (or 
steady state) for day-to-day operations, and emergency mode for response operations (Walker 
et al., 1994, p. 16).  
 
In the steady-state mode, an OSER system acts as a pollution-response preparedness system 
(Harrald, 1994, p. 203). As OSER activities require multiple-party inputs (Weller, 1997, p. 
734), such a preparedness system entails large-scale integrated organization. It is composed of 
multiple actors, with a range of mandates and functional tasks, who make decisions and work 
independently to serve the common objective. The actors‟ behaviour and performances affect 
each other and the system at large. Most OSER systems are based on cooperation among 
federal, state and local agencies. Commonly the national government takes a leading role in 
the organization of OSER, defining the policy, main principles and procedures for its 
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implementation and control (Walker et al., 1994, p. 52). The Norwegian and Russian OSER 
systems are such government-established systems. Each participant in the OSER system has a 
response role, performing a particular task (often only part of its broader mandate) as defined 
by its mandate. OSER systems often rely on a unified command and control mode of 
operation with established procedures and clearly defined hierarchy of authority, but with 
varying degrees of formality (Harrald, 1994, p. 207). 
 
 
Setting the stage 
1. Legislation and regulation 
2. Multi-national agreements 
 
Developing a plan 
3. Resources at risk 
4. Spill risk analysis 
5. Risk minimization 
6. Evaluation of response technologies 
7. Net environmental benefit analysis 
8. Expert information sources 
9. Contingency planning 
 
Organization and communications 
10. Response management systems 
11. Notification systems 
12. Communications 
13. Safety for responders and public 
14. Security 





16. Source control, salvage, and firefighting 
17. Response technologies 
18. Waste management 




20. Spill monitoring, tracking, and sampling 
21. Cleanup assessment 
22. Data management and access 
23. Logistics 
24. Finance, administration, and procurement 
25. Demobilization 
 




28. Sustainability and improvement 
 
Table 1. Oil spill response planning and assessment categories and elements (Source: Taylor 2008, p. 7).  
 
„The crucial function of preparedness [for an oil spill] is the creation of a response system 
capable of effectively responding to … a relatively rare and complex event‟ (Harrald, 1994, p. 
204). In the emergency mode, an OSER system creates an organizational subsystem that 
responds to the specific event (Harrald, 1994). This subsystem is termed a response 
management system (RMS) and is defined as „the combination of organizational structure, 
management processes, individual roles, and operational strategy employed during an oil spill 
response‟ (Walker et al., 1994, p. 15). The challenge in developing an effective RMS lies in 
finding the optimal way to bring together the entities of an OSER system, as they normally 
operate independently of one another (Walker et al., 1994, p. 16). A simplified example of 
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typical (local) response organization is presented in figure 2. The term „OSER system‟ is used 
to establish some common fundamentals for organizational structures, roles and 





















Figure 2. Typical local response organization (Source: International Maritime Organization, 1995, p. 9) 
 
OSER systems commonly enter emergency mode in turbulent and event-driven environments 
where they have to adapt continuously (Harrald, 1994, p. 205). In the case of a more extensive 
operation this system should be capable of incorporating itself into a larger (area or national) 
response organization that has been established according to similar structural principles 
(International Maritime Organization, 1995, p. 9).   
 
Both pollution response preparedness systems and response management systems are 
complex organizational systems tailored to respond to a low-probability, high-consequence 
event (Harrald, 1994). This study does not aim to discuss the different modes of operation of 
OSER systems: no distinction will be made between an OSER system as a pollution response 
preparedness system or as an organizational subsystem created in an emergency situation. 
Therefore, I apply the term „OSER system‟ as a general one. To tackle the complexity of the 
issues involved in analysing an OSER system and to achieve the research purposes, my study 
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requires a comprehensive analytical framework. This is presented and discussed in the 
coming sections.  
 
2.2. OSER system through the lenses of Mintzberg 
 
To handle the complexity of an OSER system, I have taken systems thinking as a point of 
departure in the analysis. Being a holistic approach, systems thinking allows for a 
comprehensive view of the unit of analysis (Checkland, 1981; Olsson and Sjőstedt, 2004). 
Traditionally this approach has been applied to the analysis of intraorganizational phenomena, 
whereas I apply it here in an interorganizational setting.  Taking an OSER system as „a set of 
elements standing in interaction‟ (Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 39) can provide a representation of an 
integrated structure composed of multiple interdependent and interacting organizations, 
whose individual performances affect the functioning of the system as a whole. This section 
introduces the approach of Mintzberg (1983) to provide a holistic view of OSER activity and 
create a basis for discussing OSER systems in terms of organizational theory. Here I begin by 
presenting some general points in Mintzberg‟s analytical approach and then explain how it is 
applied in this study.  
 
Mintzberg argues that the design of the structure of an organization that is „the sum total of 
the ways in which its labor is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved 
among these tasks‟ is the most important element in the effective functioning of organizations 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p. 2; p. v). He has synthesized the vast literature on organizational design 
in order to create a typology of organizational structure. This typology is based on five „ideal‟ 
configurations and offers a framework helpful for understanding organizational structures in 
relation to the ideal types. Mintzberg‟s model is based on the assumption that „formal and 
informal structures are intertwined and often indistinguishable‟ aspects of organizational 
structure. Formal structures evolve in organization over time, often reflecting the changes that 
occur within the informal structures (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 9).  
 
  
Mintzberg defines organizational structure as a combination of five basic components that 
provide a basic diagrammatic configuration of any organization (1983, pp. 9‒19). The 
strategic apex is the organization top administration, with the chief executive officer and the 
other high-level managers together with their secretaries and assistants who bear overall 
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responsibility for organization. Their tasks involve organizing work process in terms of 
decision-making and development of organizational strategy, structuring the organization and 
resource allocation, controlling employee performance and solving conflict, as well as 
managing the relations of the organization with it environment. Ultimately, their primary job 
is to ensure the effective functioning of the organization (pp. 13‒14).  
 
At the other end of the organization lies the operating core, which includes all employees 
directly related to the production of services or products. Their primary functions are to 
secure the inputs, transform these into outputs, distribute the outputs, and provide direct 
support to the inputs, transformation, and output functions. The operating core is the part of 
the organization where its business value is produced (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 12‒13).   
 
The strategic apex and the operating core are connected through the middle line, the chain of 
middle-line managers with formal authority. This chain runs from the senior managers to 
those who have direct authority over the operators, establishing the flow of direct supervision 
between the strategic apex and the operating core and ensuring that work is delegated 
according to the lines produced by the strategic apex. The larger the organization, the longer 
the middle line will be. The key function of middle-line managers is to manage the 
performance of those units they are responsible for. They maintain regular contacts with other 
managers, analysts, support staffers, and the outsiders whose work is interdependent of their 
own units. Their job is to provide regular performance feedback to the senior managers 
(Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 14‒15).  
 
The technostructure and the support staff are the two remaining important organizational core 
elements. The technostructure consists of analysts and experts who are not directly involved 
in the production process but who work to increase the effectiveness of organizational 
performance. They standardize the work of the operating flow by defining, planning, 
designing, changing it and training the people who do it. The technostructure operates at all 
levels of the organization to make the work of the others more effective (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 
15‒16). The support staff is found at various levels throughout the hierarchy and includes 
groups of employees in the organization whose primary function is to provide support to the 
organization outside its operating workflow. Support staff includes, for example, the security 




To ensure that all tasks performed by an organization are brought together, coordination 
mechanisms are required. Coordination among the core tasks is achieved by a mix of five 
mechanisms including mutual adjustment, direct supervision, and standardization (of work 
processes, outputs, and skills) (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 3‒9). The present study will not deal 
with all five coordination mechanisms. Following the propositions of the analytical 
approaches to interorganizational coordination discussed in sections 2.3 to 2.4 (see also 
Martinez and Jarillo, 1989, p. 490), I restrict the focus to formal and informal coordination. 
These two forms of interorganizational coordination are dealt with in detail in articles II and 
III. I return to these issues in chapter 5 where the final discussion of the findings is presented.  
 
The power balance between the elements of the organization is defined by the degree of 
vertical and horizontal decentralization. Vertical decentralization implies a transfer of formal 
power down the chain of authority (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 99), for example from a federal to a 
regional or municipal agency. Horizontal decentralization indicates that power is shifted from 
a line manager to non-managers – staff managers, analysts, support specialists and operators 
(p. 105).   
 
Organizational structures emerge from different organizational characteristics and are shaped 
by external circumstances.  Each in its own way (five basic components, five mechanisms of 
coordination, and five types of decentralization) contains a set of factors that influence the 
emerging organizational structure. Each of the five key elements of organizational structure 
constantly pulls an organization in five different directions: the strategic apex pulls for 
centralization, technostructure for standardization, support staff for collaboration, operating 
core for professionalization, and the middle line for a „balkanization‟ of organizational 
structure (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 153‒155). The ultimate interactions between these directions 
determine the structure of the organization, i. e. its configuration as a logically consistent 
clustering of its elements (p. 23). To be effective, the clustering must be established in 
harmony with both the internal organizational processes and the organizational situation (the 
environment) (p. 122).  
 
Mintzberg identifies five main configurations of organizational structure: the simple structure, 
the machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy, the divisionalized form, and the 
adhocracy (see table 2). Each configuration relies on a particular coordination mechanism; 
each tends to favour one of the core parts of the structure and uses one of the five particular 
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approaches to decentralize its structure. Trying to fit an individual organization into the 
framework of a single configuration would be a mistake. Experiencing all five of the pulls, 
real organizational structures rarely fit into a distinct structural model and usually represent 
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To develop an model of an abstract OSER system, I have plotted the key tasks that must be 
accomplished to ensure successful oil spill preparedness and response (Taylor et al., 2008) 
into a structural model based on Mintzberg (1983, pp. 11, 18) (Figure 3). The resulting model 
reflects an OSER system in the steady-state mode. It shows that all the key elements can be 
distinguished within the structure of an OSER system. However, we should note that the 
categories which are part of the key structural elements in the ideal model are not absolute. 
They may diverge in different OSER systems depending on structure of the system in 
question. Coordination among the system participants is usually standardized, achieved both 
through a set of agreed formal procedures (formal organizational structure itself, 
standardization of work processes and outputs through contingency plans, agreements, 
meetings and standardization of skills through for example exercises and training) and 
informal practices that have been developed.  
 
Although an OSER system is an emergency response organization, it is designed to work 
within a bureaucratic framework that is rather rigid due to the continuous striving for 
standardization. The uniqueness of an OSER system lies in the fact that its structure is 
twofold and therefore extremely contingent. The configuration of the model may vary 
depending on the mode of operation of the system and the complexity of the incident in 
question. In the steady-state mode, its precise structure may be rather difficult to define. 
While its core is stable, the periphery is diffuse. This is because the activities of some 
organizations are only partially related to OSER and may or may not be involved in its daily 
activities. Actor mobilization is totally dependent on the nature of the emergency to be 
handled. An OSER system is primarily a bureaucratic organization with a clear line of 
authority. Its structure is centralized along a vertical dimension, with formal power 
concentrated in the upper reaches of the hierarchy. The degree of vertical decentralization will 
depend on the complexity of the incident. Most oil spills are small and can be dealt with by 
the polluter or the regional (municipal) authorities, but state and federal resources are 






Figure 3. Configuration of an OSER system based on the key structural components  
 
The structural configuration of the system in the emergency mode is a function of the nature 
of the oil spill (Walker et al., 1994, p. 27). The larger the spill, the greater will be the number 
of the participating organizations and levels of authority involved, and the more complex will 
the organizational structure become. There is no universally accepted model of an OSER 
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system in the emergency mode. Every oil spill is unique: and the complexity of the tasks and 
the number of the participants involved will depend on the demands of each particular 
emergency situation (Harrald, 1994; Walker et al., 1994, p. 30). The Incident Command 
System (ICS)
2
 is a type of organizational structure an OSER system may adopt in the 
emergency mode (Figure 4). The basic characteristic of ICS structure is that it is widely 
applicable. Initially developed for fighting forest fires, the structure has been adapted for use 
in various types of emergency operations resulting from both natural and technological 
accidents, including oil spill response (Walker et al., 1994, p. 25). ICS is based on a command 
and control approach and is structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: 
command, operations, planning, finance, and logistics. Its adaptable nature and ability to 
integrate multiple resources quickly into a joint and effective goal-oriented team are main 
advantages of the ICS structure (Walker et al., 1994, p. 26).  
 
 
Figure 4. The five principle components of the Incident Command System (ICS) (Roland and Cameron, 
1991 cited in Walker et al., 1994, p. 26)  
 
Because an OSER system operates both in the steady state and the emergency mode, its 
structure is hybrid. Visual evaluation of the ideal model (i.e. an OSER system‟s structure in 
the steady state) closely approaches the machine bureaucracy configuration (Mintzberg, 1983, 
p. 163). As defined by Mintzberg, the design parameters of the machine bureaucracy draw on 
„highly specialized, routine operating tasks; very formalized procedures in the operating core; 
a proliferation of rules, regulations, and formalized communication throughout the 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed discussion of the Incident Command System structure see for example Walker et al., 1994. 
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organization; large-sized units at the operating level; reliance on the functional basis for 
grouping tasks; relatively centralized power for decision making; and an elaborate 
administrative structure with a sharp distinction between line and staff‟ (p. 164). Machine 
bureaucracy relies on the standardization of its operating work processes for coordination (p. 
163), so technostructure, with its focus on standardizing, is the core part of the organization. 
 
Among the machine bureaucracies, contingency bureaucracy is a type of structure relevant for 
this study. A fire department is an example proposed by Mintzberg (1983, p. 175), whereas I 
refer to an OSER system in the steady-state mode. Contingency bureaucracies „exist not to 
provide routine services, but to stand ready in the event of the need for nonroutine ones. But 
because these services are critical, the organizations must plan elaborate procedures to 
respond quickly and efficiently to every contingent event that can be anticipated. Their 
operators then spend their time practicing these procedures and waiting around for an event to 
occur, hopefully one of the contingencies anticipated‟ (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 175). What pulls 
an OSER system towards a machine bureaucratic structure is the special need to formalize its 
procedures in the steady state to ensure that these will be carried out to the letter when a state 
of emergency arises (ibid.). The environment for the machine bureaucracy is simple and 
stable: most of its contingencies are predictable because they have occurred before. This can 
help to explain why extensive formalization of procedures is common in OSER systems. Any 
unexpected contingency will draw the structure towards an organic form (ibid.).  
  
I do not provide an ideal model for an OSER system in the emergency mode. However from 
figure 4 we may conclude that the structure of an OSER system in the emergency mode tends 
to a simple configuration (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 157‒158). Among simple structures we can 
distinguish the crisis organization that I relate to the configuration of an OSER system in the 
emergency mode. Such a crisis organization, explains Mintzberg, „appears when extreme 
hostility forces an organization to centralize, no matter what its usual structure‟ (p. 160). The 
need for fast, coordinated response is what pulls an OSER system towards a simplification of 
structure and a reduction in bureaucratic procedures in the emergency situation.   
 
The strategic apex becomes the key part of the organization (i.e. the incident commander in 
figure 4) while the power of the other core elements in the simple structure is temporarily set 
aside. During oil spill emergencies, analysts and experts from the technostructure often 
remain on the periphery of the OSER system, entering the scene only after the clean-up 
25 
 
operation has been accomplished. A dynamic environment permits the simple structure to be 
organic, especially as regards its operating core (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 158). This contradicts 
the concept of the ICS structure, which was originally conceived as a closed type of system, 
based on a command and control approach. However, it should be noted that the ICS structure 
depicted in figure 4 is very basic. In practice, it will vary from a more open to a more closed 
type of organizational system depending, inter alia, on the institutional framework and 
organizational culture (Walker et al., 1994, p. 73).  
 
Mintzberg (1983, p. 122) argues that „successful organization designs its structure to match its 
situation‟. Therefore, effective interorganizational response in a crisis situation is dependent 
upon using appropriate organizational models. However, every oil spill is unique, and large 
spills can create highly complex situations with extreme uncertainty. An effectively 
functioning OSER system must be highly adaptable, capable of modifying and adjusting 
rapidly and continuously during a crisis event (Walker et al., 1994). In chapter 5, I apply the 
ideal model to illustrate the configuration of the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems and 
to reflect on whether and how these configurations are affected in an emergency situation.   
 
The theoretical propositions discussed above have various analytical implications for this 
study. An OSER system is to be approached as a complex multi-organizational structure. The 
analysis has to consider the unique nature of an OSER system – its duality and the extreme 
contingency of its structure. The effectiveness of an OSER system depends on the ability of 
multiple actors to coordinate their mutual efforts in order to achieve common goals. From the 
discussion presented above I have formulated the first research question: What are the basic 
characteristics and determinants of the organizational structure of an OSER system?  
 
2.3. Interorganizational coordination 
 
Coordination as a form of organizational behaviour is a concept central to organizational 
studies (Alexander, 1995; Oliver, 1990, p. 241; Jennings, 1994, p. 53) and can be both an 
intra- and an interorganizational phenomenon. In order to reflect the complexity and 
dynamics of oil spill emergency response, coordination will be defined in this study as „both a 
process – the act of coordinating – and a goal: the bringing together of diverse elements into a 
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harmonious relationship in support of common objective‟ (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986, p. 
224).  
 
Coordination should be distinguished from other related phenomena (Dijkzeul, 1997, p. 64). 
As regards the present study, the distinction between coordination and cooperation (the latter 
term occurs in articles II, III and IV without definition) should be explained. I understand 
cooperation as „deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organizations for the joint 
accomplishment of individual operating goals‟ (Schermerhorn, 1975, p. 847). Just as 
coordination, cooperation takes place when „two actors work for a common cause‟ for a 
particular reason (Dijkzeul, 1997, p. 64). Both cooperation and coordination are part of the 
process of policy integration and are based on organizational interdependence (Meijers and 
Stead, 2004, p. 5). However, coordination requires more interaction, accessibility and 
compatibility of resources, which both follow from and lead to greater interdependence. It 
entails a higher degree of formalization of institutional arrangements, involves more 
resources, presents a greater threat to stakeholder autonomy and is more comprehensive and 
demanding in terms of time, space and actors (Meijers and Stead, 2004, p. 5). 
 
Interorganizational coordination is considered a strategic problem in interorganizational 
analysis (Litwak and Hylton, 1962, p. 399), and achieving effective coordination has been 
compared to „the twentieth century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher‟s 
stone‟ (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986, p. 219). It becomes particularly challenging in multi-
organizational environments like the OSER systems examined in this study (Coastal 
Response Research Center, 2006, p. 9; Stevens and Aurand, 2008; Tuler et al., 2007). In 
multi-organizational OSER systems where individual tasks are performed by independent 
organizations, interorganizational coordination is needed to enable all parties to work together 
towards a common goal. It is crucial for the effective functioning of the system: indeed, 
organizational failures in coordination may ultimately mean overall failure for an OSER 
operation 
 
(Tuler et al., 2007, p. 34). However, the organizations that are to coordinate may 
not necessarily be compatible. They may have conflicting functional responsibilities, diverse 
organizational cultures, may rely on different criteria in decision making, and have different 
geographical locations (Harrald, 1994, pp. 211‒212). In an emergency situation, achieving 
coordination becomes even more challenging, since „not only more but new organizations 
have to be coordinated with‟ (Quarantelli, 1986, p. 15). The need to integrate diverse 




To work together in complex and turbulent environments, organizations frequently develop 
formal or informal relationships (Moynihan, 2005 and LaPorte, 1996 cited in Kapucu, 2009, 
p. 2). As formal and informal aspects are intertwined parts of the organizational process 
(Selznick, 1948, p. 27; Minzberg, 1983, p. 9), I examine both the formal mechanisms of 
interorganizational coordination in the OSER systems studied here (organizational structure, 
law and regularization, and standardization of organizational processes through formal 
agreements, contingency plans, and training exercises) and the informal ones (lateral 
relationships, personal communication and organizational culture). (See table 3; also Hall et 
al., 1977, p. 459; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989, pp. 490‒491.) However, the objective of this 
study is not to examine organizational culture as such. Further, I do not restrict the discussion 
to the analysis of particular forms of formal and informal coordination, but have aimed at 
identifying all means of coordination involved in the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems. 
We return to table 3 in chapter 5 in discussing the main finding regarding various forms of 
coordination the OSER systems. 
 
Mechanisms of coordination 
Formal Informal 
Mandated Standardized-voluntary Voluntary 
Mandated Non-mandated (voluntary) 
Forms of coordination 
 
Table 3. Mechanisms and forms of organizational coordination in the OSER system (based on Hall et al., 
1977 and Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). 
 
Studying the formal aspects of organization implies examining organizations functionally in 
respect to their roles (Selznick, 1948, p. 26). In the present work, considerable effort has been 
made to define the formal aspects of the national OSER systems, modes of interorganizational 
coordination, and the joint Norwegian‒Russian oil spill response regime. The formal 
structures provide the formal norms of behaviour and therefore determine organizational 
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action, as well as constraining how tasks are carried out (Christensen et al., 2007, p. 27). 
Formal mechanisms, and hierarchies in particular, are widely regarded as the most effective 
means of coordination (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 66; Challis et al., 1988, p. xi; Martinez and 
Jarillo, 1989; Peters, 1998, p. 49; Thomas, 2003, p. 21). Oil spill emergencies have 
traditionally been dealt with by military units, otherwise known for their highly hierarchical, 
formalized structures (Dynes, 1994). The formal coordination mechanisms define the 
structure, roles and functions of the interacting organizations. They establish the operative 
coordination procedures through joint exercises and patterns of interaction in an emergency 
situation, for example through contingency plans and emergency groups. 
 
Just as the formal organizational structure is not an adequate reflection of the totality of 
empirical organizational reality (Selznick, 1948, p. 25), interorganizational coordination is 
more than a purely formal process. Formal procedures primarily connect roles and functions 
but not individuals, and should thus be seen as merely one part of the coordination process in 
organizations (Selznick, 1957, p. 8). The informal coordination will tend to build on lateral 
relationships, personal communication, and organizational culture (Martinez and Jarillo, 
1989, p. 491).  
 
It has been argued that „when the totality of interacting groups and individuals become the 
object of inquiry, the latter is not restricted by formal, legal, or procedural dimensions….A 
proper understanding of the organization process must make it possible to interpret changes in 
the formal system … in their relation to the informal and unavowed ties of friendship, class 
loyalty, power cliques, or external commitment‟ (Selznick, 1948, p. 27) because „… that 
which is not included in the abstract design (as reflected, for example, in a staff-and-line 
organization chart) is vitally relevant to the maintenance and development of the formal 
system itself‟ (p. 25). Moreover, formal coordination procedures may not be effective in all 
circumstances (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986, p. 225; Thomas, 2003, p. 24) – especially in 
multi-organizational settings where there is no clear formal structure and where traditional 
top‒down control mechanisms may be insufficient (O‟Toole, 1997). In complex situations, 
formal organizational structures may fail: and then informal mechanisms may compensate for 
the formal shortcomings or serve as supplementary means of coordination (Chisholm, 1989, 
pp. 23, 36). Therefore, in this study, informal mechanisms are regarded as equally important 




In analysing formal and informal coordination mechanisms, one important aspect is the nature 
of their interplay (Lie, 2010, p. 6). The theoretical assumption is that the synergetic interplay 
of formal and informal mechanisms leads to better interorganizational coordination; 
conversely, a competitive relationship between the two mechanisms will result in weaker 
coordination. Articles II and IIII examine the interplay of the coordination of formal and 
informal mechanisms in terms of synergies and competition, focusing on how this interplay 
may affect interorganizational coordination and thus the effectiveness of an OSER system. 
 
Thus, interorganizational coordination in OSER systems is established both through formal 
(organizational structure, law and regularization, formal agreements, contingency plans) and 
informal (lateral relationships and personal communication) mechanisms of coordination. The 
analysis will focus on the interplay of the formal and informal means of coordination, so as to 
reveal whether they work together synergistically or impede each other.  
 
From the analytical assumptions discussed above, the following research questions emerge: 
(2) How do formal and informal mechanisms of interorganizational coordination provide for 
the effective functioning of an OSER system? and (2a) What is the relationship between formal 
and informal coordination mechanisms? Articles II and III in particular deal with these 
questions. 
 
2.4. Coordination as a function of organizational interdependence 
 
Interdependence implies that inadequate performance of one individual part affects the total 
and thus the other parts (Thompson, 1967, p. 54). Interdependence is implicit for 
interorganizational coordination (Alexander, 1995, p. 31; Halpert, 1982, p. 57; Meijers and 
Stead, 2004, p. 5; Lindblom, 1965; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Litwak, 1970; Thomas, 2003: 
19; Thompson, 1967, p. 55) as it „suggests the minimum condition for any form of linkage‟ 
(Litwak and Rothman, 1970, p. 147). It characterizes the relationship between the actors who 
interact to create an outcome (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 40). Interdependence among 
organizations is an essential precondition for coordinated organizational relationship 
(Alexander, 1995; Litwak and Hylton, 1962), and coordination among organizations is a 
function of the degree of interdependence (Litwak and Rothman, 1970, pp. 147‒150). With 
interorganizational systems where the actors have individual responsibilities specified in their 
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mandates, understanding the nature of the interdependencies between the organizations 
involved is crucial for understanding their coordination.  
 
The study is based on the premise that interdependence can affect interorganizational 
relations. Studies of interorganizational analysis emphasize „mechanisms that maintain 
distance between units as well as mechanisms which integrate units with each other‟ (Litwak 
and Rothman, 1970, p. 140). Here I assume that interdependence may facilitate effective 
coordination, or it may hamper it. „Facilitative‟ and „competitive‟ interdependence are the two 
categories of interdependence in focus in this study.   
 
Interdependence in an OSER system is primarily provided by the shared purpose of 
conducting a joint response operation (Tuler, et al., 2007, Walker et al., 1994). The agenda is 
set by the regulatory framework and contingency plans that define how activities are to be 
conducted, the responsibilities of individual authorities and their patterns of interdependence 
and coordination. In a multi-organizational setting, it is vital for the participating 
organizations to agree on the goals (Walker et al., 1994, p. 21). For organizations working 
together to achieve individual or shared goals, interdependence provides a commonality of 
purpose (Chisholm, 1989, p. 37) that facilitates effective coordination (Seidman and Gilmour, 
1986, p. 223).  
 
On the other hand, interdependence may create obstacles for coordination and even induce 
competition among participating organizations (Thomas, 2003, p. 3; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Interdependent organizations have less freedom of action or lower organizational 
autonomy
3
 (Mulford and Rogers, 1982, p. 15). Increasing interdependence reduces each 
organization‟s ability to maintain its identity associated with the internal core task (Wilson, 
1989, pp. 182, 187) or organizational ability to achieve its goals. When core functions are 
threatened, organizations may exhibit competitive behaviour (Ellison, 1995, p. 44) that 
triggers the urge to protect autonomy (Wilson, 1989, p. 192). One consequence may be failure 
in interorganizational coordination (Peters, 1998, p. 303).  
 
Organizational performance could be compared to the behaviour of fish in coral reef: „[t]o 
survive [an organization] needs to find a supportive ecological niche. Sometimes that niche is 
                                                 
3
 Autonomy is here defined as a „condition of independence sufficient to permit a group to work out and 
maintain a distinctive identity‟ (Selznick, 1957, p. 121). 
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specified by law, … [b]ut often law is sufficiently vague as to give the founding executive a 
chance to seek out a niche‟ (Wilson, 1989, p. 188‒189). Interdependencies and the struggle 
for survival may lead to different kinds of strategies in organizational behaviour. On the one 
hand the need for an organization to survive generates a strong motive for inter-agency 
coordination (Halpert, 1982). However, reliance on their organizational environments may 
create uncertainties (Thompson, 1967, p. 13). To ensure stability and survival, organizations 
may seek to buffer their boundaries (Scott, 2003, p. 128) and/or protect their autonomy – or 
„turf‟ (Wilson, 1989, p. 179). As turf is primarily a resource (Thomas, 2003, p. 34) the more 
resources an organization has at its disposal, the better (Bardach, 1996, p. 177 cited in 
Thomas, 2003, p. 33) as this reduces organizational sensitivity and uncertainty (Dimock, 
1952, p. 282 cited in Thomas 2003, p. 32). This may lead organizations to act imperialistically 
(Wilson, 1989, p. 187), seeking to enlarge their jurisdictions to protect their autonomy 
(Downs, 1967, p. 215, Thomas 2003, p. 28). Various forms of non-cooperative behaviour 
(Jennings and Krane, 1994, p. 342) and attempts to exclude competitive organizations from 
domains can be the outcomes of such strategies. Clearly, then, autonomy protection aimed at 
preserving identity and organizational ability for goal achievement may become a barrier to 
interorganizational coordination (Wilson, 1989, p. 192; Jennings, 1994, p. 57; Jennings and 
Krane, 1994, p. 342). 
 
The analytical implication is that an OSER system should be approached as a structure based 
on interdependence among individual organizations. Since interdependence may create 
different incentives of organizational behaviour in terms of coordination, it is necessary to 
study the nature of interdependencies among and between organizations – in particular in 
interorganizational settings like OSER systems – to understand coordination patterns among 
the individual organizations.  
 
To explore how interdependence affects organizational behaviour in terms of 
interorganizational coordination in an OSER system, the following research question has been 
formulated: how do the patterns of interdependence among organizations in OSER systems 
affect interorganizational coordination? The impacts of interdependence on 
interorganizational coordination are discussed in articles II and III. These studies discuss the 
causes of interdependence among organizations in an OSER system and how interdependence 




2.5. The effectiveness of OSER systems 
 
The search for ways to increase the effectiveness of organizational performance lies at the 
heart of organizational studies (Cameron, 2011). How to manage oil spills for greater chances 
of a successful outcome has attracted widespread interest and discussion (see for example 
Harrald et al., 1992; Harrald, 1994; Walker et al., 1994; Weller, 1997; Kuchin and Hereth, 
1999; Ott et al., 1999; Ornitz and Champ, 2002; Tuler et al., 2007; Davidson et al. 2008). 
Organizational effectiveness can be measured by various yardsticks, depending on how an 
organization is conceptualized (Scott and Davis, 2007, p. 326). In the context of this project, 
effectiveness is understood as „the ability of the OSER system to respond to an oil spill which 
requires a comprehensive coordination effort‟ (Ivanova and Sydnes, 2010, p. 140). 
Organization is a key factor for successful oil spill response (Harrald, 1994; Ott et al., 1999). 
And coordination of the participating organizations is a main condition that must be met for a 
response operation to be successful, i.e. effective (Harrald, 1994, p. 213). 
 
The success of OSER operation is a multi-dimensional concept (Harrald, 1994, p. 218). 
Measured instrumentally, it is associated with achieving response objectives (Walker et al., 
1994, p. 21): that an OSER system „will effectively, efficiently, and safely respond to oil 
spills‟ (Ott et al., 1999). This entails the ability of organizations to employ the right amount of 
available resources in accordance with the procedures defined in the contingency plan to deal 
with emergency situations (Harrald, 1994, p. 213; Walker et al., 1994, p. 21).  
 
In my articles, the analysis of effectiveness is based on two approaches. One involves mainly 
statements from informants: in interviews, I posed specific questions that made it possible to 
draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of an OSER system. A more specific approach was 
applied in article IV, on the Norwegian‒Russian bilateral regime for joint oil spill response in 
the Barents Sea, where effectiveness was studied by examining its outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts (see Young, 2004). Outputs include the procedures implemented to transform the 
regime from a paper arrangement into a practical process. The outcomes are the changes in 
organizational behaviour that emerge as the result of the creation and functioning of a regime. 
These changes involve, inter alia, compliance and conformance on the part of the regime 
members to the regime. The impacts of a regime are related to its problem-solving capacity or 
ability to deal effectively with the problem it is meant to tackle. My assessment of regime 
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effectiveness also builds on qualitative data; textual documents (academic publications, 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, evaluation reports, protocols of the joint meetings, and 
publicly available information from relevant web sites) and interview data from informants 
involved in the cooperation. The qualitative approach was chosen due to the absence of 
formal objective standards for evaluating effectiveness. 
 
If an individual OSER system can be considered a „regime‟, the effectiveness of such a 
system can be assessed by examining its outputs, outcomes, and impacts. We return to the 
indicators of effectiveness employed in the analysis of the Norwegian‒Russian bilateral OSR 
regime in chapter 5, where I use them to summarize the discussion of effectiveness of the 




























































In this chapter, I present and discuss the collection of empirical data for my study: what sort 
of material was collected, why certain methods of data collection were chosen, how the 
process of data collection was conducted, what challenges were experienced and what I 
learned in the process. Finally, comments will be made regarding the robustness of the study.  
 
3.1. Research questions and methodology 
 
„Good social science is problem-driven…‟ (Flyvbjerg, 2007, p. 432). Naturally the process of 
data collection in this study was inspired by the research objectives I had formulated. The 
form and content of the research questions have informed the choice of a qualitative
4
 research 
strategy (Silverman, 2005, pp. 99‒100, 111; Yin, 2009, p. 8) and helped to limit the data-set 
to reasonable proportions (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001, p. 239).  
 
Research is more than collecting data to discover answers to certain questions: it involves the 
application of systemic procedures typical of different research strategies (Berg, 2007, p. 8). 
My choice of the qualitative research tradition has predetermined the selection of research 
strategy and the methods of data collection here, not least the case-study form. Case study has 
been defined as „an empirical enquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident … relies on multiple sources of evidence … and … benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis‟ (Yin, 2009, p. 
18). Case studies are used for the analysis of organizational and managerial processes (Yin, 
2009, pp. 4‒5), such as organization of oil spill emergency response examined here.  
 
The cases in the project consist of two national (the Norwegian and the Russian) studies and 
one international (Norwegian‒Russian) case. OSER systems are the cases in the two national 
studies, whereas the bilateral Norwegian‒Russian OSR regime is the case in the international 
one. The three cases are united by a common geographical focus, the Barents Sea. More space 
is given to the examination of the Russian OSER system. The Russian case study was the first 
                                                 
4
 Quantitative analysis deals with counting and measuring, whereas qualitative strategy focuses on non-
numerical values and expressions rather than quantifications (Berg, 2007, pp. 3, 8–9). Qualitative research 
generally examines social settings, the individuals who inhabit them and the processes within these settings 
related to how people structure their settings, give meanings to their daily lives through symbols, rituals, social 
structures and roles, and make sense of themselves and others. 
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to be conducted. The absence of available scholarly information on the system made it more 
challenging and time-consuming to collect data on the Russian case. Before I could proceed 
to analyse interorganizational coordination in the Russian OSER system it was necessary to 
get an overview of the system itself. It was not possible to perform both tasks within the scope 
of a single research article, and so the Russian case was investigated in two articles. The 
Norwegian case was less complicated in terms of data collection, as data on the Norwegian 
OSER system are publicly available.  
 
One advantage of the case study is its ability to „“close in on” real-life situations and test 
views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice‟ (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 428). 
In addition, case study allows use of a full range of sources, including documents, artefacts, 
interviews and observations (Yin, 2009, p. 11). To provide better quality of my data I 
combined three methods of data collection: textual analysis, interviews, and observation. 
 
One of the challenges in conducting the study was that neither the Russian system nor the 
Norwegian‒Russian bilateral OSR regime discussed here has ever been involved in a large oil 
spill operation. Therefore, there are no incidents on which to base an evaluation of their actual 
performance. This had implications for data availability and collection. I had to rely heavily 
on interview data in investigating the Russian case, to compensate for the lack of textual 
materials.  
 
This study combines elements of three different types of case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 8). First, 
as descriptive fact-finding aimed at clarifying the status of oil spill emergency preparedness in 
Norway and Russia, where the challenge is to conduct detailed analysis of one phenomenon 
(OSER system) in two different national contexts. Second, this study is explanatory in terms 
of the research questions asking „how‟. Finally, it should be seen as exploratory research, as 
the conclusions generate further questions, defining the grounds for new research (Yin, 2009, 
pp. 8‒9). The study also belongs to the interpretive research tradition.
5
   
                                                 
5
 The interpretive and positivist traditions are two main schools of thought in social science. Rejecting the 
subjectivity of knowledge (Delanty and Strydom, 2003, p. 14), positivism applies the models and methods of 
natural science to the study of human affairs (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 7) and is consequently associated 
with quantitative methods of data collection. Interpretive philosophy, based on the premise that the social world 
should be approached in a different way than the natural world, focuses on social relations and on how the 
processes of meaning-making, interpretation and communication are conducted (Hatch and Yanow, 2003, pp. 
65, 70). It stresses that knowledge comes a priori before the research process and should therefore be treated as a 
matter of interpretation (Hatch and Yanow, 2003, p. 66; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p. 6), so qualitative research 




3.2. Interview  
 
Interviewing is one of the most extensively applied methods of data collection within 
organizational studies (Cassel, 2009, p. 500) and a main source of empirical information for 
case studies (Yin, 2009, pp. 106‒109). Semi-structured interviews have been an invaluable 
source of empirical information for the Norwegian, the Russian, and the Norwegian‒Russian 
case studies presented here. Though the data were collected through a range of sources, 
interviews stand out as a key source of information that otherwise would not have been 
available – for example, regarding informal mechanisms of coordination and effectiveness of 
the OSER systems. My interview data are qualitative in nature.  
 
Interviewing formed the starting point of this study. After having been admitted to the PhD 
programme in Norway I was waiting for the visa formalities to be settled. During that period, 
in August 2007, three unstructured interviews were conducted with Russian informants, with 
representatives of the organizations that dealt with OSER in the Murmansk region. These 
were a controlling authority, an emergency response organization, and a non-governmental 
organization that conducted expert analyses of OSER in the Murmansk region. Interviewing 
at this initial stage provided important primary knowledge on the research subject. In 
particular, it enabled me to identify areas that later proved useful in formulating the research 
questions. In addition, meeting informants prior to my actual fieldwork made it easier to 
establish further contacts.  
 
Between August 2007 and December 2010, a total of 26 interview sessions were conducted 
with 17 Russian informants. All the interviews, with two exceptions, were conducted in 
Murmansk. With three exceptions, the interviews with Russian informants were conducted in 
Russian. Again with three exceptions, I was the sole interviewer; the informants were 
interviewed individually, with one exception. Twelve interviews with 13 Norwegian 
informants were carried out between December 2009 and June 2011, in Tromsø, Horten, and 
Stavanger.  
 
All the Norwegian and three Russian informants were interviewed in English with Are K. 
Sydnes, who is the co-author of three chapters in this study. There were 2 on-line (Skype) 
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interviews, one with a Norwegian and one with a Russian informant, and two telephone 
interviews with Norwegian informants. All other interviews were conducted face-to-face, a 
procedure considered to provide better data quality, due to the greater opportunities to re-
mould and re-direct the conversation (Stephens, 2007, p. 211). My experience has shown that 
being able to communicate directly while interviewing generally offered more room for 
dialogue with the informants, whereas telephone communication led to a dry, factual and less 
flexible conversation. I believe that having face-to-face communication helped to establish an 
atmosphere of trust, so essential in interviewing (Miller and Glassner, 2004, p. 133) and in 
consequence improved the quality of the empirical data.  
 
In an interview setting there is always the concern whether the information the respondent 
provides to the researcher is truly what he or she is thinking. Respondents may not be eager to 
share their personal attitudes, especially when the subject may be somewhat touchy (Miller 
and Glassner, 2004, pp. 126‒127). Issues related to OSER proved to be a sensitive topic for 
discussion both in Norway and Russia, in particular for officials and members of the civil 
service. My informants did not refuse to answer questions, but they were cautious in their 
judgements. I was aware that the inappropriate disclosure of personal insights and 
confidential information might have negative consequences for the informants.  
 
To ensure confidentiality and to encourage the sharing of personal opinions and attitudes, I 
made sure, at an early stage, that interviews would remain anonymous. All informants have 
been number-coded and are referred to as „INF number XX‟ in the articles. I asked for 
permission to record interviews with a dictaphone. Two of the Russian informants preferred 
handwritten notes to be taken; among the Norwegians, four interviews were recorded and the 
remainder involved note-taking. In the cases when interviews were conducted together with 
Are K. Sydnes, both of us took notes and later discussed and compared them. As the 
interviews were semi-structured, additional questions were asked in the course of the 
interviews. All records were later transcribed.  
 
To make the process of data collection more transparent, the methodology section of each 
article provides lists of informants in the form of a table with the name of the organization, 
the level of seniority of the informant, and the interview date
6
. Two general criteria for 
                                                 
6
 See Annex I for a complete list.  
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selection were the formal position of the individual informants together, and the relevance and 
formal role of their organizations in oil spill emergency response activities. These 
organizations included governmental and municipal authorities, response organizations, 
controlling and coordinating authorities, private companies, non-governmental organizations, 
scientific research institutions, and industry. Some informants were interviewed once, while 
with others (on both the Norwegian and Russian sides) several sessions were conducted. 
Some informants, also on both sides, were contacted by mail after the interview sessions to 
clarify issues that arose during the analysis of the interviews.  
 
Prior to interview sessions, informants were provided with a short description of the project; 
and those who requested it also received a list of interview questions. Some informants, in 
particular the Russian ones, did not ask to see the questions in advance. Interviewees 
represented a wide range of organizations and had diverse functions, so there was no single 
questionnaire for all informants. With the Russian informants, individual questions were 
prepared depending on the functional tasks of the organizations they represented. These 
questions fell into six categories: (1) the organization itself, (2) coordination, (3) risk, (4) 
capacity, (5) plans, (6) personal.  
 
In the Norwegian case, all questions were organized into identical categories: (1) the national 
OSER system in Norway, (2) the role of the organization in the national OSER system, (3) 
coordination between various actors within the Norwegian OSER system, (4) the risk of oil 
spills, (5) contingency planning in Norway, (6) other issues. However, the content of the 
questions varied slightly and some individual questions were asked depending on the 
functional tasks of the organization the respondent represented and the issue discussed. 
Moreover, questions from category 4 on risks of oil pollution were abandoned rather early, 
when it became evident that there was close consent among the Norwegian informants as to 
the sources of risk.  
 
There are differences between the two sets of questions because the questions for the 
Norwegian case (which was investigated later) were made more specific. In addition, the 
inavailability of literature on the Russian OSER system led me to ask questions unnecessary 
in the Norwegian case, where data could be obtained through other sources. Annex II 




In some cases, the questions served as points of departure reflecting the most important issues 
that needed to be dealt with. Sometimes I used information obtained from one informant to 
formulate additional questions to another interviewee, or to collect data to support (or not) 
what another person said. The non-rigid schedule and structure characteristic of qualitative 
interviews (Bryman, 2008, pp. 437‒438), allowed for flexibility in communication and better 
interaction with the informants. Respondents felt less constrained and sometimes talked 
freely, touching on important issues that would have otherwise have remained undiscovered.  
 
Formulating the interview questionnaires proved to be a learning process in terms of getting 
new knowledge and sharpening my interviewing skills. The first questionnaire was intended 
to be used for several interview occasions. However, I soon understood that it would be 
necessary to develop individual sets of questions because the organizations in question were 
so diverse. I also recall a situation when the Russian informant (who had not asked to see the 
questions prior to our meeting) took the questionnaire and started looking through it, 
simultaneously analysing and commenting on the weak sides and advantages of the questions 
and giving advice regarding the types of questions that should to be asked to various 
informants. Gradually, the quality of the questions improved. I started to establish categories 
or groups of questions, like the ones in the Norwegian case. And as I learned more about the 
subject of my research, the questions could become increasingly precise.  
 
When doing interviews in two different national contexts it is difficult to avoid comparing 
how the informants, representatives of different countries, handle the process. Overall, both 
the Norwegian and Russian informants were willing to meet and I experienced no refusals. 
Most informants were generous with their time – in fact, the longest interview lasted for more 
than two hours. In addition, some informants, particularly on the Norwegian side, helpfully 
provided clear instructions on how to get to their office, assisted with transportation, and even 
provided something to eat. Unexpectedly, I found that very few Russian informants feared 
being recorded, and were also very open in their comments. In contrast, as I had expected the 
reverse situation, many of the Norwegian respondents were opposed to my using a 
dictaphone. Interestingly, while trying to arrange interviews with some organizations of the 
Norwegian OSER system I was advised to contact the Norwegian Coastal Administration 
instead, because „they are responsible for everything and will be able to answer all the 
questions‟ (from a phone conversation with a potential informant). As a result, some 
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informants on the Norwegian side had to be convinced that their point of view would be 
valuable for my research.  
 
3.3. Textual analysis  
 
It is difficult to imagine a study of an organizational setting without document analysis. 
Textual materials were important sources of empirical information also in this study, and the 
findings are largely based on their analysis in addition to the interview data. Documents can 
serve as both inputs and outputs of social activities. Therefore they should be regarded as part 
of social interaction and as independent data (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004, p. 59). In this study 
both the content as the initial value of a document (Prior, 2003) and its function and the effect 
it produces (Prior, 2003, p. 4) have been central. For example, contingency plans were 
analysed in terms of their content and of the constraints they impose on organizations.   
 
Extensive literature searches were conducted to gather primary and secondary texts. Official 
documents (international agreements, laws and regulations, official reports, protocols of the 
joint Norwegian‒Russian meetings, the work programme of the Joint Norwegian‒Russian 
Environmental Commission, contingency plans, training exercises evaluation reports, 
interorganizational agreements) have served as the primary sources of information. Secondary 
sources include the scholarly literature (articles and books), formal agency documents, 
conference proceedings, and relevant scientific reports. Collecting primary data through 
document searches provided me with useful background information prior to field visits (Yin, 
2009, p. 103). 
 
Legal documents publicly available on the websites of the Russian federal and regional 
governments were used extensively in articles I and II, the Russian case study, to study the 
regulatory framework and organizational functions in the Russian OSER system. Scientific 
publications, reports, and conference papers and articles provided information on petroleum 
developments in the area and data related to the management of oil spill response. In articles 
II, III, and IV, contingency plans were scrutinized to identify the coordination procedures. In 
article III, the Norwegian case study, law documents, governmental white papers, reports and 
presentations of various agencies and contingency plans provided data on the key actors 
within the Norwegian OSER system and their responsibilities, and made it easier to 
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distinguish the basic principles and recent developments in the system. Article IV, the 
Norwegian‒Russian case study, relies on the analysis of scholarly publications, multilateral 
and bilateral agreements, multilateral and bilateral training exercise evaluation reports, 
protocols of the joint Norwegian‒Russian meetings, and the work programme of the Joint 
Norwegian‒Russian Environmental Commission. 
 
Publicly available textual data was also gathered through Internet searches of the websites of 
various organizational and institutions referred to in the articles. The poor availability of 
textual data on the Internet on the Russian case in general and very limited publicly available 
information on the subject on the websites of the Russian ministries of Transport and 
Emergencies should be noted. The information on the website of the Murmansk Basin 
Emergency Rescue and Salvage Department proved to be very general and limited, nor was it 
clear how often it is updated. By contrast, the websites of the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration and the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs have separate regularly 
updated sections on acute pollution and oil spill emergency preparedness. Many of the 
documents used for the analysis were not directly publicly available and were obtained 
through respondents. Examples are the Joint Norwegian-Russian Contingency Plan and 
training exercise evaluation reports referred to in article IV, interorganizational agreements 




Ethnographic research makes frequent use of observation, which involves „entering the setting 
of some group and simply watching and listening attentively‟ (Berg, 2007, p. 192). 
Observation as a method of data collection was used only once in this study, when Are K. 
Sydnes and I participated as observers at the inaugural meeting of the Norwegian forum for 
oil spill preparedness and response in the High North, held in Tromsø, Norway in February 
2011. The mandate of the forum is to facilitate coordination among actors in OSER in the 
Norwegian High North (Norwegian Coastal Administration, 2010b). The meeting was a 
closed event and special permission required to be present there. The key value of attending 
the meeting lay in getting an overview of the wide range of actors within the Norwegian 
OSER system and gaining access to their presentations. In addition, it provided an 
opportunity to meet new informants, and two interviews with Norwegian informants were 
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arranged as a result of this meeting. Furthermore, it provided access to new empirical data for 
the Norwegian‒Russian case study that helped to sharpen the study objective in terms of 
formulating more precise research questions.  
 
3.5. Research robustness  
 
Research must ensure that the methods used are reliable and the conclusions valid. The 
quality of any empirical social research is commonly measured through four widely used 
tests: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2009, p. 40). 
The following section presents some remarks on the quality of my study and the efforts taken 
achieve it.    
 
3.5.1. Ensuring reliability 
 
Reliability has to do with consistency or replicability of research measurements (Silverman, 
2005, p. 224). Research is considered reliable if, when „a later investigator followed the same 
procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same … study all over 
again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions‟ (Yin, 2009, p. 
45). To demonstrate that research techniques are reliable, the researcher must ensure that 
procedures are systematically documented to demonstrate the consistency of applying the 
categories (Silverman, 2005, p. 224). The process of data collection has to be open and 
transparent. However, the criterion of replicability may be challenging. For example, it is 
impossible to replicate the interview process, because any interview setting will always be 
contextual. Nor is there any no guarantee that another researcher will contact the same 
informant, or even if the informant is the same that an interview will be granted. I recall from 
my own experience one Russian informant who agreed to meet me only after this person 
found out that a close relative of mine was working at the same organization. After having 
learnt this, the informant became eager to meet me, and was frank and open during the 
interview session, sharing personal opinions. Another interview with a Russian informant was 
arranged on the request of a mutual acquaintance. I am uncertain how successful I would have 
been if I tried to arrange the meeting with that informant directly, or whether another person 
would have granted an interview. Two interviews with Russian informants were arranged by 
other informants whom I had visited earlier. In particular, interviewing in Russia I observed 
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that being introduced by someone in some cases was helpful in getting informants‟ consent to 
meet and facilitated open dialogue during the interviews. In all cases, I tried to be open about 
my sources of information and the methods of data collection applied, to allow others to 
scrutinize the data collection process and quality.  
 
To increase the reliability of data and to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation I 
sometimes used a dictaphone during interviews, but always with the consent of the 
respondent. Annex I provides detailed information regarding the interview sessions when a 
dictaphone was used.   
 
3.5.2. Ensuring internal validity 
 
Reliability is related to validity. Achieving valid conclusions is a central objective of any 
research. Regarded as a synonym for „truth: interpreted as the extent to which an account 
accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers‟ (Hammersley, 1990, p. 57) 
validity is frequently mentioned as the most important criterion for research (Bryman, 2004, 
p. 28). Validity in qualitative analysis concerns „the integrity of the conclusions that are 
generated from a piece of research‟ and can be distinguished in the forms: as construct 
validity (measurement validity), internal validity and external validity (generalizability) 
(ibid). 
 
Construct validity concerns the accuracy of the operational measures used to denote the 
theoretical meaning of the concepts in the study (Bryman, 2004, p. 28). In this study, I operate 
with a range of concepts (e.g. OSER system, interorganizational coordination, 
interdependence, organizational structure) whose dimensions are defined by their definitions. 
These concepts are further made operative with the empirical data. The theoretical problem 
addressed in the study is related to interorganizational coordination, which is defined as „both 
a process ‒ the act of coordinating ‒/and a goal: the bringing together of diverse elements into 
a harmonious relationship in support of common objective‟ (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986, p. 
224). Empirically the issue of interorganizational coordination is addressed in articles II and 
III by studying relationships among the organizations participating in an OSER system. 
Effective interorganizational coordination is crucial to the success of an oil spill response 
operation. An OSER system is understood here as a structure based on interdependence – and 
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interdependence can affect interorganizational coordination. My analytical propositions 
suggest that certain factors facilitate coordination while others hamper it. From the analysis, 
coordination emerges as an intermediate variable that affects the effectiveness of OSER 
systems and is affected by interdependence. Through the analysis of interorganizational 
coordination, I have also addressed the issue of the interplay of the formal and informal 
means of coordination, to see whether they work together synergistically or impede each 
other.  
 
Internal validity is concerned with the causal relationships (interdependences) between 
variables in the study (Bryman, 2008, p. 32). This form of validity is relevant for explanatory 
studies where the researcher seeks to provide evidence on how and why event x led to event y. 
The trap here is when the conclusion about the causal relations between x and y is made 
without considering a possible third variable z, which may also cause y (Yin, 2009, pp. 
42‒43). As to the theoretical proposition for this study, internal validity gives rise to two 
questions: is the relationship between interdependence and interorganizational coordination 
genuine? and can we be sure that interdependence truly causes variations in 
interorganizational coordination? Yet another question concerns the causal effect of 
coordination on how effectively an OSER system performs. To increase internal validity, I 
have employed explanation building supported by a logic model (Yin, 2009, p. 41) which 
demonstrates the causal relationship between the main variables.  
 
To increase the validity of conclusions, a range of methods of data collection (interview and 
textual analysis) have been employed – a strategy referred to as triangulation. Triangulation 
involves the use of various kinds of data and methods to check whether they corroborate each 
other (Bryman, 2008, p. 700). In my work, combining two research techniques has provided 
access to a broader data-set, thereby helping to yield a fuller picture of the phenomena under 
study: OSER system and interorganizational coordination.  
 
In addition, respondent validation (Silverman, 2005, p. 212) was used. During the interview 
process, many informants showed an interest in the results of this study and asked to be 
provided with the articles when they were published. Both Norwegian and Russian informants 
regarded this as an opportunity to learn new things about each other. For me it was a good 
opportunity to receive feedback and evaluation. In practice, one Russian respondent has read 
article II after it was published, and has provided positive feedback. In particular it was 
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commented that the key points of the case were presented correctly. Constructive feedback 
from a Norwegian informant (who was contacted for an interview and asked for the draft 
version of the paper) was received on the Norwegian‒Russian case study.  
 
3.5.3. Ensuring external validity 
 
External validity, or generalizability, defines to what extent it is possible to take a broader 
view from the research results, beyond the specific research context (Bryman, 2008, p. 55). 
Do the results of this study permit such generalization? Generalization from just three single 
cases to a broader set of cases is difficult to conduct with any certainty. Case studies often 
examine phenomena within real-life contexts (Yin, 2009), which implies that the knowledge 
produced is context-dependent. The major point of criticism concerning the case-study 
approach is the failure of a single case to serve as a basis for generalizing (Yin, 2009, p. 43). 
In quantitative research, generalizability can be achieved by, for example, statistical sampling 
procedures that allow researchers to feel confident about the representativeness of the sample 
and to make broader inferences (Silverman, 2001, p. 248).  
 
Although these methods are not immediately applicable in qualitative research, 
generalizability can be increased through some techniques that do not follow a purely 
statistical logic. Such strategies include using theory in single case studies and using 
replication logic in multiple case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 41). In addition, analytical 
generalization as an alternative to statistical generalizations is important in case-study 
research that involves generalization of „a particular set of results to some broader theory‟ 
(Yin, 2009, p. 43).   
 
To show that the findings of a given case study can be extrapolated to a broader set of similar 
cases, the researcher must demonstrate that similar theory can be applied for the analysis. In 
this study, the analysis builds on similar analytical approaches to the study of 
interorganizational coordination and interdependence in the Norwegian and Russian systems. 
In addition, Mintzberg‟s approach to the analysis of organizational structure is applied to 
illustrate the structural specifics of the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems. The intention 
behind applying an identical analytical tool is to ensure external validity of the data. That both 
cases support the same analytical approach indicates that the chosen theory is fruitful for the 
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purpose at hand, and that the received results are valid. This means that the chosen theory 
may have wider applicability than the particular cases studied.  
 
My objective is to show whether the findings regarding the Norwegian and Russian OSER 
systems may be both true and important for a broader set of OSER systems. In addition I wish 
to check the applicability of my analytical approaches to interorganizational coordination and 
Mintzberg understanding of the organizational structuring to the analysis of OSER systems, 
or other complex organizational settings as well.  
 
3.6. Limitations of data collected 
 
One weakness in my interview data is the absence of any representatives of the federal 
authorities among the Russian informants. Moreover, I did not manage to gain access to 
Russian national reports from exercises. To compensate for these shortcomings, data from 
other sources were used, such as interviews with the Norwegian representatives at the 
ministerial level, and Norwegian national reports from exercises.  
 
In addition, a larger number of informants might have been interviewed for the Norwegian 
case study. The Norwegian OSER system discussed in article III consists of an extensive 
number of participants. However, due to time constraints, representatives from only seven 
organizations were interviewed. On the other hand, there is little to indicate that additional 
data would have changed the conclusions of this study. There seems to be broad consensus on 
most central aspects of the Norwegian OSER system.  
 
I should also mention the limited use of observation as a method of data collection. There 
were a few missed opportunities to participate as observer in national and international 
training exercises. This could have further improved the quality of my findings.  
 
3.7. Concluding remarks 
 
The study of the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems has demonstrated how valuable 
qualitative data can be for the analysis of an interorganizational setting. A qualitative 
approach was used to understand how organizations within an OSER system are linked to 
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each other. Qualitative data permitted better understanding of the complexity of 
interorganizational relations, as interviews provided insight into the participants‟ views and 
assessments. In addition, the qualitative approach made it possible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of OSER systems based on statements from respondents. This was especially 






























4.1. Relationship between the articles 
 
Taken together, my four articles contribute to a holistic picture of how OSER is organized on 
the Norwegian and Russian sides of the Barents Sea and how cooperation between the two 
systems is established. Article I „maps‟ the Russian OSER system, and article II examines 
interorganizational coordination within the Russian OSER system. It proved necessary to 
conduct two studies of the Russian system because academic knowledge on this topic had not 
been established. Before embarking on a discussion of interorganizational coordination I had 
to provide an overview of the formal structure of the system and its main principles – and the 
scope of the study did not allow that to be done within the constraints of a single research 
paper. Article III examines the organizational structure of the Norwegian OSER system and 
patterns of coordination among the main actors. Finally, article IV discusses how the 
Norwegian and the Russian OSER systems operate together through the bilateral OSR regime 
and how effective this regime is.  
 
Throughout the study, coordination has been approached as a key factor affecting effective 
functioning of the OSER systems. Therefore, all four articles provide conclusions on 
effectiveness. 
 
My approach to the analysis has been informed by a range of analytical approaches. Article I 
was inspired by systems theory, with the system itself as a unit of analysis; I further examined 
the OSER system from the vertical and horizontal dimensions. Articles II and III draw on 
analytical approaches to interorganizational coordination (Alexander, 1995; Challis et al., 
1988; Chisholm, 1989; Hall et al., 1977; Jennings, 1994; Lie, 2010; Martinez and Jarillo, 
1989; Oliver, 1990; Peters, 1998; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Thomas, 2003). In article IV, 
the study of the effectiveness of the Norwegian‒Russian bilateral OSR regime is conducted 
through qualitative analysis of the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of that regime. Approaches 
to the analysis of regime effectiveness vary due to the challenges of establishing reliable 
indicators. The qualitative approach applied in this case was justified by the absence of formal 




4.2. Article findings. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the articles.   
No. Article I Article II Article III Article IV 
Title 
Oil spill emergency 
preparedness in the 
Russian Arctic: a 
study of the 
Murmansk region 
Interorganizational 
coordination in oil 
spill emergency 
response: a case 
study of the 
Murmansk region of 
Northwest Russia 
Oil spill emergency 





Russian oil spill 
response regime in 
the Barents Sea: an 
untold story of 
success 
Main focus 
Analysis of the 
organizational 
aspects of the OSER 
system in the 
Murmansk region of 
Russia 
Interorganizational 
coordination in the 
OSER system in 
the Murmansk region 
of Russia 
Analysis of the 
organizational aspects of 
the Norwegian OSER 
system, particularly its 






effectiveness of the 
bilateral Norwegian-
Russian cooperation 






The study maps the 
Russian OSER 
system 
The study examines 
interorganizational 
coordination within 
the Russian OSER 
system 
The study maps the 
Norwegian OSER 
system and examines 
interorganizational 
coordination among the 
organizations within it 
The study examines 
how well the 
bilateral Norwegian-
Russian cooperation 
functions to provide 
oil spill emergency 




How the OSER 
system in the 
Murmansk region is 
organized in terms of 
its formal structure 
and the roles and 
functions of the key 
actors ascribed by 
their mandates? 




established within the 
OSER system of the 
Murmansk Region? 
2. How organizational 
interdependencies 
affect organizational 
behavior in terms of 
coordination? 
3. How effective the 
OSER system in the 
Murmansk region is? 
1. How are the formal 
organizational structure 
of the Norwegian OSER 




2. To what extent formal 





3. Whether and how the 
interdependencies 
between the 
organizations in the 
OSER system facilitate 
coordination or create 
incentives for 
competitive behavior? 
1. How is the 
bilateral Norwegian-
Russian cooperation 
on OSR organized? 
2. What factors 
facilitate and hinder 
international 
cooperation? 
3. How effective is 
the bilateral OSR 





Systems thinking as a 
point of departure in 
the analysis followed 
by the analysis of the 
OSER system from 





Analytical approaches to 
interorganizational 
coordination 









4.2.1 Article I 
 
Of all four articles this one proved the most challenging in terms of conducting research. I 
was surprised to discover that the structure of the Russian OSER system is nowhere 
described. Systems thinking has provided a valuable starting point in the analysis of an OSER 
system and the complexity of its organizational structure. Due to the scarcity of academic 
literature, the conclusion are based largely on interview data.  
 
In this article I show that the functioning of the Russian OSER system is hampered by 
substantial shortcomings that need to be addressed. Lack of a clearly formulated and unified 
state policy is a major limitation. The system is a complex organizational setting, fragmented 
in terms of political authority and its regulatory base. Horizontally, the formal structure of the 
Russian OSER system is based on two subsystems – one for sea, one for land – operating 
independently under different ministries according to their mandates. Vertically, both sectors 
function at two levels: federal and regional. The OSER system acts in accordance with an 
extensive legislative framework developed by the Russian government and the federal 
authorities. However, this framework is partial and at times contradictory. Policy 
malfunctions have resulted in lack of precision in how the functions and areas of 
responsibility of the main federal authorities are defined. Lack of state funding hampers 
development of the OSER system and has become a constraining factor for the activities of 
response organizations that struggle to improve their capacities. Insufficient funding has led 
to the commercialization of oil spill response services. The scientific component of OSER 
remains largely on the periphery of the system, incorporated only occasionally. With no 
system for monitoring or tracking oil spills, control of oil pollution in the OSER is weak.  
 
4.2.2 Article II 
 
This article studies interorganizational coordination in the Russian OSER system. In the 
Russian system, coordination functions as a simultaneous interplay of formal and informal 
mechanisms. The formal coordination is primary in the system. It defines the structure, roles 
and functions of the interacting organizations (its formal organizational structure), and 
establishes the operative coordination procedures and patterns of interaction in an emergency 
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situation. Informal coordination is common among the actors, who are well known to each 
other. Incentives for informal coordination are increased by organizational interdependence 
which is based on the commonality of purpose. Informal contacts help actors to solve 
practical challenges both in their daily activity and in emergency situation, thus functioning as 
important complementary coordination tools. By compensating for the shortcomings of the 
formal mechanisms, informal coordination contributes to the effectiveness of the Russian  
OSER system. For example, daily personal contacts among organizational executives are 
regarded as „important complementary coordination tools‟ (Ivanova and Sydnes, 2010, p. 
152) and „the most important factor facilitating communication‟ (INF, 8: Ivanova and Sydnes, 
2010, p. 152). They „produce[] a positive impact on the work process [by helping] to 
minimize the effect of red tape [and thereby] increase[] efficiency of emergency response‟ 
(INF, 10: Ivanova and Sydnes, 2010, p. 151). Informal contacts (through personal phone 
contacts, direct requests, correspondence, and electronic mails) are especially important in 
emergency situations (INF, 10: Ivanova and Sydnes, 2010, p. 151). Together, formal and 
informal mechanisms act in a complementary way: „[w]hile formal coordination is the force 
that shapes the OSER system and defines how it operates, informal interactions are the means 
that help the formal wheel to function by smoothing its malfunctions‟ (Ivanova and Sydnes, 
2010, p. 154).  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that mutual dependence is high among organizations in the 
Russian system. United by a common purpose, participating actors rely on each other‟s inputs 
to provide effective OSER. This facilitates incentives for effective coordination because the 
actors are mutually dependent on each other‟s resources. On the other hand, 
interdependencies obstruct coordination. The issue of commercialization of oil spill response 
services resulting from inadequate federal policy (touched upon in article I) is discussed here 
in detail. Lack of funding obstructs the ability of response providers to improve their capacity 
and forces them to seek additional sources of income, leading to competition for resources 
and clients. The effectiveness of the Russian OSER system remains a theoretical issue since 
no major accidents have yet occurred in the Murmansk region. However, the majority of our 






4.2.3 Article III 
 
The article tests the same analytical approach to the analysis of interorganizational 
coordination as article II. We outline the formal structure of the Norwegian OSER system and 
mechanisms of coordination intended to make it function as a whole. The Norwegian system 
is based on a complex organizational structure which unites multiple actors at different levels. 
The Norwegian approach to the organization of OSER builds on a unitary, clearly formulated, 
communicated state policy where agreement on general principles is shared among the 
participating organizations. Cooperation among the private, municipal and state levels of 
contingency is the core of the organizational principle of the Norwegian OSER system. In a 
major emergency situation, all three contingency levels can be mobilized to act as one 
integrated national system. Strong organizational culture in the system is based on the shared 
belief that the national OSER system is a „well-run team‟ where „people know … how to act 
together‟ (informants in article III). Considering the amount of political attention that the 
issue of oil OSER has recently gained in Norway, a rather surprising finding is that 
responsibility for the OSER system is almost fully delegated to a single agency, the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration.  
 
The Norwegian OSER system relies heavily on formal mechanisms of interorganizational 
coordination: formal mandates, contingency plans and interorganizational agreements.  There 
is a continuous drive for further formalization of the procedures. Because „Norway is a small 
country‟, informal interactions among the actors are natural, since everyone knows each other. 
Informal communication is in many cases an outcome of prior formalized arrangements: 
„everything that is being done is first and foremost based on formal agreements at higher 
levels, and all other actions are in line with formal procedures‟ (informant in article III). The 
major input of informal coordination is that it facilitates effective functioning of the OSER 
system. For example, a representative of the Norwegian Clean Seas Association has noted 
that the informal contact with the Norwegian Coastal Administration „assists … in doing a 
better job in combating an oil spill … much more efficiently‟ (informant, article III). Daily 
informal communication helps the actors to know each other (informant, article III) and 
thereby facilitates ‟build[ing] the formal framework‟ to be invoked in the event of acute 
pollution (informant, article 3). As such, the formal and informal mechanisms are two 





4.2.4 Article IV 
 
Article IV shows that established Norwegian‒Russian bilateral OSR cooperation in the 
Barents Sea has developed, both professionally and personally, into what we assess as an 
effective bilateral regime. The general framework for cooperation, the roles and functions of 
the cooperating parties, and the operative coordination procedures in an emergency situation 
have been established through a set of formal institutional procedures. The stability of the 
established formal arrangements has given rise to strong informal relationships between the 
actors, relationships that function as an important facilitator for cooperation. We regard the 
regime as effective because it has managed to establish procedures for the provision of mutual 
assistance in responding to oil pollution in the Barents Sea. These procedures are practised 
regularly through bilateral and multilateral training exercises.  
 
Bilateral Norwegian‒Russian cooperation proceeds at both the ministerial (managerial) level, 
where the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs and the Russian Ministry of 
Transport are involved, and the agency level (professional or operative), between the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration and the Murmansk Basin Emergency Rescue and Salvage 
Department. Strong and successful cooperation at the agency level has made this cooperation 
„a very special technical branch for especially interested people‟ (informant, article IV).   
 
Article IV also identifies some aspects that inhibit effective cooperation and may ultimately 
affect joint response procedure in an emergency situation. These include obstacles caused by 
bureaucratic procedures on the Russian side; Norwegian uncertainties as to how the Russian 
OSR system will function in an emergency due to the multiplicity of actors and to the 
differences in approaches experienced in planning and conducting exercises; and insufficient 
knowledge of the domestic OSR system in Russia on the Norwegian side. One important 
finding is what inhibits cooperation often originates in factors external to the cooperation and 
does not stem from the relationship between the key authorities responsible for operative 
cooperation.  
 
Analysis of the inhibitors predominantly linked to factors on the Russian side reveals that 
these factors are results of the shortcomings of the Russian OSER policy. The inadequacy of 
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this policy at the national level produces negative outcomes for the bilateral cooperation. 
Empirical evidence indicates that outcomes of the bilateral cooperation have had limited 
effect on national policies in Norway and Russia.  
 
4.3. Summary of the findings 
 
To facilitate this summary of the main findings I have plotted them into a table (see table 5). 
In addition to the findings directly related to the main research questions, the table contains 
sections on outputs, outcomes, and impacts that I have tried to identify for the Norwegian and 
Russian OSER systems.  
 
An OSER system is a complex structure of mutually dependent organizations, each relatively 
autonomous, that must work together to serve a larger system. Interorganizational 
coordination is established through formal and informal mechanisms. Both mechanisms are at 
play simultaneously, although formal procedures are the primary means of coordination. 
Their main function is to define the formal structure, including the roles and functions of the 
interacting actors, and to establish coordination procedures for daily activity as well as for 
emergency situations. Informal interactions are regular among the actors, but the functions 
very. It is not the formal and informal coordination mechanisms individually but their 
interplay that provides for effective functioning of an OSER system. Therefore, while 
coordination must be recognized as a complex process, the focus of the analysis must be on 
how formal and informal aspects work together. Interdependence is characteristic of an OSER 
system and may affect organizational behaviour in term of interorganizational coordination. 
The study has provided evidence that interdependence may both facilitate and hamper 



















based on the commonality 
of purpose 
based on actors mutual 
dependence on each other‟s 
inputs to provide effective 
and efficient OSER 
based on a common 
understanding of a problem 
to be addressed and a shared 
interest to strengthen the 
joint efforts in combating 




formal and informal; 
interplay is synergetic 
formal and informal; 
interplay is synergetic 
formal and informal 
Formal 
coordination 
defines the formal 
organizational structure and 
establishes the operative 
coordination procedures and 
patterns of interaction in an 
emergency situation 
defines the formal structure 
of the system, roles and 
functions of the interacting 
organizations; establishes 
the operative coordination 
procedures and patterns of 
interaction in an emergency 
situation 
defines the roles and 
functions of the interacting 
parties and establishes the 
operative coordination 





facilitates the formal 
mechanisms and 
compensates for their 
shortcomings 
facilitates effective 
functioning of the OSER 
system; is often based on 
formalized procedures 
informal relationship is an 




substantial shortcomings in 
the regulatory framework; 
organization process is not 
accomplished 
based on a unitary, clearly 
formulated, communicated 
and agreed upon among the 
participating actors state 
policy 
regime functions through a 




plan, joint training exercises 




formal and informal 
mechanisms function 
simultaneously; informal 
coordination somewhat in 
opposition to formal; 
competition among the 
response providers as one of 
the outcomes of 
interdependence and 
organizational shortcomings 
in the system 
formal and informal 
mechanisms function 
synergetically as two 
complementary parts of one 
process, providing for more 
effective coordination; no 
major coordination 
challenges that impede the 
system's effectiveness 
regime has become a strong 
partnership based on the 
procedures established by 
the functioning institutional 
arrangements; stability of 
the formal arrangements has 
given rise to informal 
relationships between the 
actors and the development 
of a “special culture around 
this cooperation”; limited 
effect on the national OSR 
policies 
Impact 
effectiveness remains a 
question; informants are in 
general optimistic but some 
express doubts related to the 
shortcomings of the 
regulatory framework 
the system has been 
strengthened substantially 
during the last years and is 
being constantly improved; 
despite the absence of major 
challenges related to 
interorganizational 
coordination it is an issue to 
be considered for the 
effective functioning of the 
system and is being 
continuously dealt with to 
be improved 
procedures for the provision 
of mutual assistance in 
responding to oil pollution 
in the Barents Sea are 
established and regularly 
practiced; effectiveness in 
terms of ability to handle a 
major accident remains a 
question 
 





In this chapter, I return to the research tasks and deliberate upon them in relation to the 
analytical perspectives outlined above and the possible implications of these findings. Finally, 
I will reflect on the effectiveness of the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems. 
 
5.1. The OSER systems revisited 
 
Having presented the major findings, it is time to revisit the OSER systems that have been the 
unit of analysis throughout this study, to view it in terms of organizational theory. In this 
section, I highlight the key structural characteristics of the Norwegian and Russian OSER 
systems, on the basis of Mintzberg‟s approach discussed in section 2.2, and examine how 
these are determined. This discussion will involve the main issues related to formal and 
informal aspects of interorganizational coordination and organizational interdependence 
within the OSER systems.  
 
To facilitate the discussion, I have modelled each OSER system on the „ideal‟ model of an 
OSER system presented in section 2.2 (figure 3). It should be noted that these models take 
into consideration all the components of the OSER systems. I discuss how the five basic 
components bring forth the main structural characteristics of the Norwegian and Russian 
OSER systems, and how the structure is affected by the mode of operation.      
 
OSER systems are large, and consist of a wide range of organizations that may be involved in 
an emergency situation (see for example annex I in article III or table 3 pp. 146‒147 in article 
II). My analysis throughout the study has focused on the organizational aspects of OSER and 
on the key actors in particular. In terms of the basic components this means I have 
concentrated on the strategic apex, the operating core, and (to a limited extent) the middle 
line. The technostructure and support staff are presented in the studies but not analysed 
explicitly, although there is a focus on the contingency planning and exercises that constitute 
an important part of technostructure. Here I stay with this approach and discuss the OSER 
systems‟ configurations based on the key actors referred to in the articles. In addition, I build 
the discussion on the two main modes of operation of OSER systems: the steady-state and the 




In line with Mintzberg, I warn the reader that „the case for each configuration is overstated to 
make it clearer, not to suggest that every organization … exactly fits a single configuration‟ 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p. 156). Thus, the presentation of system structures in terms of particular 
configurations is done for analytical and illustrative purposes, and deviations between the 
„ideal‟, theoretically consistent and the real combination may emerge.  
 
5.1.1. The Russian OSER system 
 
On the whole, the Russian OSER system is a cumbersome, sector-based structure established 
at the federal and regional level, with several ministries and their underlying agencies sharing 
responsibilities. Despite the sectorization, interdependence among the organizations in the 
system is high. The Russian informants repeatedly emphasized the OSER system as a tight 
community where organizations rely on each other‟s inputs to enable an effective oil spill 
response operation. Representatives of the Russian system noted that participating actors „are 
well acquainted with each other; they communicate regularly also on a personal basis‟ 
(Ivanova and Sydnes, 2010, p. 154).  
 
The Russian system is based on a hierarchical command structure established at multiple 
levels: the federal centre makes decisions, while the regions execute them and also bear 
responsibility for conducting OSER operations in case of emergency (Ivanova, 2011). 
Articles I and II identified several substantial shortcomings in the Russian OSER system, 
including lack of a clearly formulated and unified state policy, sectorization, fragmented and 
incomplete regulatory base, lack of state funding that hampers the activities of response 
organizations, commercialization of oil spill response services, science being relegated to the 
periphery of the system, and the absence of a system for monitoring or tracking oil spills. The 
lack of a unified state policy and single responsible authority has affected the unity of the 
organizational structure of the OSER system. (See figure 5a for a model of the Russian 
system in the steady-state mode.)  
 
The strategic apex is split because the two federal authorities, the Ministry of Emergencies 





 A dual strategic apex gives rise to a split middle line which connects it to 
the operating core. As to this middle line, for OSER at sea it consists of the federal authorities 
subordinate to the Ministry of Transport (the Federal Agency of Marine and River Transport, 
the State Marine Emergency Rescue and Salvage Coordination Service, Gosmorspasslužba), 
and Murmansk Marine Salvage Coordination Centre; for OSER on land, it involves the Main 
Department of the Ministry of Emergencies in the Murmansk region. The operating core is 
composed of two parts, representing the two sectors of the national OSER system responsible 
for land territory and for sea. The latter is represented by the Murmansk Basin Emergency 
Rescue and Salvage Department (MBERSD); the former, by private professional response 
providers, MBERSD, and other search-and-rescue services and teams.  
 
Figure 5a. Configuration of the Russian OSER system (steady-state mode)  
                                                 
7
 To simplify, I have not included in the model the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology (another key 
actor in the Russian OSER system), which is responsible for policymaking in the sphere of control and 





Sectorization of the Russian OSER system has also affected its technostructure element. 
Contingency planning for the land territory and for sea is disjointed and uncoordinated. The 
OSER system at sea operates in accordance with the Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan for 
the Western Arctic Sector produced by the Central Marine Research and Design Institute. 
OSER operations on land are conducted in line with the Murmansk Regional Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan developed by the regional Emergency Commission and approved by the 
Main Department of the Ministry of Emergencies in the Murmansk region.  
 
Study findings reveal that the scientific component that is part of technostructure is not 
closely coupled with the rest of the Russian OSER system. The activities of scientific research 
institutions in the region are unsystematic and lack a common agenda. In terms of the 
structural configuration, this implies that technostructure element in this part is somewhat 
loosely coupled with the rest of the structure. This study does not indicate whether the 
procedures for training exercises are sector-based or unified, so I can offer no conclusions 
regarding sectorization there. Nor has the support-staff component been discussed in detail in 
the studies, although article II provides an overview of organizations that perform oil spill 
support functions (see table 3 in article II, pp. 146‒147). In addition, article I reveals that a 
proper system of environmental monitoring and tracking of oil spills has not been established 
in the region. This implies that the support-staff component in the Russian OSER system is 
weakened.  
 
A notable feature of the Russian OSER system is that its organizational structure changes 
drastically in the emergency mode. The configuration is transformed into a more linear 
structure. This emergency-mode structure resembles the simple structure configuration 
consisting of the strategic apex and operational core (see figure 5b).  
 
The strategic apex is represented by the regional Emergency Commission, a new institutional 
body that appears in particular in emergency situations. The Commission is a coordinating 
body to be convened in the event of an oil spill and is headed by the regional government. 
The main task of this body is to mobilize, organize and bring together all available resources 
and organizations needed for a successful OSER operation in the Murmansk region. The 
Commission is a platform that integrates all structural components of the system, including 
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the technostructure and support staff. It unifies the sea and land sectors and also includes 
representatives of the technostructure and support staff on a needs basis. The operating core 
remains functionally sectoral but is unified through the Emergency Commission.  
 
 
Figure 5b. Configuration of the Russian OSER system (emergency mode)  
 
 
Comparison of the two structural configurations shows that the Russian system experiences 
different pulls depending on the mode of operation. In the steady-state mode, it functions as a 
contingency bureaucracy ready to provide its services if an emergency occurs (Mintzberg, 
1983, p. 175). Its structure gets pulled in the direction of technostructure (due to the 
continuous drive to standardize procedures through contingency planning) and strategic apex 
(because the power of the federal authorities in the Russian system is strong and most 
regional-level actions are subject to their approval). In the emergency mode, the structure is 
simplified and becomes more linear. Now it is pulled in the direction of the strategic apex and 
operating core, where the strategic apex integrates the components of technostructure and 
support staff.  
 
5.1.2. The Norwegian OSER system 
 
The Norwegian OSER system is tightly coupled and unified (see figure 5c). As noted by one 
Norwegian informant, the national OSER system is relatively small community, with fewer 
62 
 
than 100 people working with oil spills in Norway. Our Norwegian informants have 
repeatedly described the national OSER system as „a well-run team‟ where „a few people … 




Figure 5c. Configuration of the Norwegian OSER system (steady-state mode)  
 
In the Norwegian OSER system a small strategic apex stands against a relatively large 
operating core. The system is multi-level. Unlike the Russian system, there is a clear centre of 
authority: the Norwegian Coastal Administration has sole responsibility for the organization 
and coordination of the country‟s OSER system. The national contingency is delegated to 
subsystems of the private sector (established by oil operators, terminals and the Norwegian 
Clean Seas Association (NOFO)), the municipal level (established by the municipalities and 
inter-municipal emergency response regions), and the state level (established by the 
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Norwegian Coastal Administration). Thus, the operating core is composed of three 
subsystems. When required, all three may be mobilized to act as one integrated national 
system. Therefore, they are modelled as a single operating core unit.  
 
The technostructure is a strong and tightly coupled element in the structure of the Norwegian 
system. All levels of preparedness act in accordance with contingency plans that are 
standardized, coordinated and integrated into one national OSER plan to ensure that the 
national system will function as a single integrated response organization in the event of an 
emergency. Regular exercises are conducted at all national levels of preparedness in 
accordance with an annual programme established by the Norwegian Coastal Administration. 
These include integrated exercises where personnel and resources from private industry, the 
municipalities, the government and the Coast Guard are involved. The support-staff 
components of the Norwegian OSER system are not discussed in detail in the study, but the 
overview of the actors (see annex I in article III) shows that there are many organizations that 
may become involved in an OSER operation if needed. I therefore conclude that the support 
staff is a strong element is the Norwegian OSER system.  
 
A particular feature of the Norwegian system is that the Norwegian Coastal Administration is 
the dominant national actor in the system, functioning as part of the strategic apex, the 
operating core, the middle line, the technostructure, and even the support staff. The 
Norwegian Coastal Administration is like a hub (see figure 1 in article III) that mobilizes and 
coordinates the other key national actors.  
 
In an emergency situation, the organizational structure of the Norwegian system remains 
relatively similar to the state-state mode (see figure 5d). It turns into a somewhat truncated 
version of the steady-state mode structure in that it becomes more flat while retaining the key 
structural components. The system is led by the Norwegian Coastal Administration. The 
components of technostructure and support staff become to a certain degree detached yet 
remain integral to the configuration, as organizations representing these may at any time be 





Figure 5d. Configuration of the Norwegian OSER system (emergency mode)  
 
Like the Russian OSER system, the Norwegian system is affected by different pulls 
depending on its mode of operation. Functioning as a contingency bureaucracy in a steady-
state mode, the system is pulled in the direction of the technostructure and strategic apex. In 
the emergency mode, the middle line and the operating core become the core of the system. If 
we disregard the technostructure and the support-staff components invoked on demand in an 
emergency situation, the structure of the Norwegian OSER system in the emergency mode is 
in fact very similar to the simple structure configuration.  
 
5.2. The OSER systems compared 
 
The discussion above and the findings of the study have revealed several similarities in the 
Norwegian and Russian OSER systems. Both are complex organizational structures 
consisting of multiple interdependent organizations that interact with each other. The systems 
are primarily state-run and are based on a command and control approach. Both systems are 
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contingent in that they adjust their organizational structure and the number of actors involved 
to the mode of operation and the complexity of the incident.  
 
5.2.1. Interorganizational coordination 
 
The function of interorganizational coordination in the Norwegian and Russian OSER 
systems is to bring together the multiple parts of a complex OSER system and harmonize 
their interaction. Overall analysis of mechanisms of interorganizational coordination in the 
systems (see articles II and III) shows that both systems rely on the simultaneous interplay of 
formal and informal coordination mechanisms, and that their interaction provides for effective 
functioning of the system. Although approaches to the organization of oil spill response in 
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Formal Informal 



















seminars, forums (eg. for 
the coordination of OSER 








Mandated Non-mandated (voluntary) 
Forms of coordination 
 
Table 6. Mechanisms and forms of organizational coordination in the OSER system (based on Hall et al., 
1977 and Martinez and Jarillo, 1989) 
 
Analysis of the role of different mechanisms of coordination in the Norwegian and Russian 
OSER systems shows that formal mechanisms are the primary means of coordination. The 
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formal organizational structure of the system is a mechanism that defines how the roles and 
functions of the main interacting organizations are differentiated and brought together. 
Formalities establish coordination procedures for the steady-state mode (e.g. 
interorganizational agreements) and the emergency mode of operation (e.g. contingency 
plans). That formal approaches are the primary mechanisms of coordination is hardly 
surprising, given the nature of the problem to be dealt with. Oil spills are emergencies which 
have usually fallen under the mandate of military units, where hierarchy and formal 
procedures are common (Dynes, 1994). Both the Norwegian and the Russian OSER systems 
are based on a command and control approach that favours formalized communication based 
on rules and regulations. And indeed, formal coordination has been conventionally regarded 
as the most effective (Challis et al., 1988, p. xi; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Peters, 1998, p. 
49; Thomas, 2003, p. 21). 
 
On the other hand, this study has indicated that formal approaches to coordination may fail, 
despite their significance for the coordination process. If „[c]oordination cannot be imposed, 
[i]t has to be created‟ (Quarantelli, 1986, p. 14), this study provides evidence that the national 
policy framework for OSER activities play an important role in harmonizing the formal 
mechanisms of coordination. My findings regarding the Russian OSER system indicate that if 
the regulatory framework for OSER activities suffers from substantial shortcomings, formal 
coordination may be undermined. In such a situation, the informal mechanisms have a crucial 
role in compensating for the malfunctioning of the formal procedures. 
 
In both the Norwegian and the Russian OSER systems, informal means of coordination are 
important, but their impacts vary depending on the circumstances. In the Norwegian OSER 
system, the major input of informal coordination is its ability to facilitate the formal 
mechanisms and thereby contribute to system effectiveness. The Norwegian case indicates 
that even in the presence of strong formal procedures there is a need for informal 
coordination. Turning to the Russian OSER system, we note that informal coordination is 
even more significant. As remarked by one Russian informant „…we proceed not from the 
notion of functional relationship but from the notion of reasonability and certain 
pragmatism…‟ (informant, article II). There it compensates for the shortcomings of the 
formal mechanisms (Chisholm, 1989, pp. 23, 36) and their insufficiency (O‟Toole, 1997). 
One informants referred to in article II commented on the Russian OSER system as follows: 
„on the one hand there are objective contradictions that lay in the essence, . . . there are 
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objective prerequisites that pull down the whole thing, that take the whole thing apart already 
in the bud, on the other there are human relationships that somehow smooth all that over and 
build up the whole thing‟. Thus, it would seem that the informal aspect is crucial in the 
Russian OSER system.  
 
That informal coordination is especially important in both systems in the steady-state mode of 
operation, i.e. when an OSER system functions as a machine bureaucracy, might appear 
contrary to certain key characteristics of a machine bureaucracy. As noted by Mintzberg, „… 
the administrative structure of the Machine Bureaucracy is ill-suited to the use of mutual 
adjustment [i.e. coordination by informal communication]. All the communication barriers in 
these structures – horizontal, vertical, status, line/staff – impede informal communication‟ 
(1983, pp. 182‒183). A possible explanation for the Russian case lies in the shortcomings of 
the formal procedures. As to the Norwegian system, it has emerged that, although informal 
communication is helpful, all procedures and actions are based first and foremost on formal 
agreements at higher levels, and so all informal actions are in line with formal procedures.  
 
Does the shift from the steady-state to the emergency mode of operation affect the use of 
mechanisms of interorganizational coordination? In the Norwegian OSER system, there is a 
striving for action in accordance with the formal coordination procedures established by the 
„duty system‟, a formal organizational structure, contingency plans, and agreements in case of 
emergency. As commented by one Norwegian representative: „From the first minute of an 
accident I have to be conscious: now we are no longer informal. Now it is a sharp situation 
and we have to communicate formally and correctly‟ (informant, article IV). This indicates 
that in the Norwegian OSER system informal communication becomes subordinate in an 
emergency situation. It is impossible to draw a similar conclusion regarding the Russian 
OSER system, simply because there are no empirical data: the Russian system has never been 
involved in a large oil spill emergency operation. However, since informal coordination is 
highly important in the Russian system in its daily mode of operation, I would expect it to 




Interdependence in both the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems is based on a 
commonality of purpose, with the involved organizations aiming to achieve shared goals (see 
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Chisholm, 1989, p. 37; Halpert, 1982, p. 57; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Thomas, 2003, p. 
19). My empirical findings support the theoretical propositions that interdependence can 
create mixed motives for coordination. It may pull interorganizational interactions together, or 
apart. It is this dualism of interdependence that adds to the explanation of why actors within 
an OSER system (the Russian one in particular) will cooperate under some circumstances and 
compete under others.   
 
One the one hand, the interdependence provided by commonality of purpose produces a 
strong incentive for cooperation, thereby facilitating effective coordination. As a 
representative of the Russian OSER system noted „… we proceed not from the notion of 
functional relationship but from the notion of reasonability and certain pragmatism, what is 
advantageous for us, whom do we need today, who needs us, where can we earn money to 
support ourselves, where can we extract some profit, where can we gain something, political 
dividends after all. Therefore we have to cooperate . . . we are obliged, we must cooperate and 
we do it with those in whom we are interested and with those who are interested in us‟ 
(informant, article II). Similarly, actors in the Norwegian OSER systems share a sense of 
common purpose, that the inputs of the individual organizations are crucial for providing 
effective and efficient response: „… there is little disagreement on how the system should 
work. … We are a small country, we have to cooperate and agree‟ (informant, article III).  
 
Commonality of purpose facilitates interorganizational coordination, but the latter is also 
interest-driven. Organizations seek assistance from each other to enhance their performance in 
day-to-day activities and even more so in emergency situations. This need becomes a driving 
force for coordination. In both the Norwegian and the Russian OSER systems, the actors‟ 
desire to consolidate their efforts through interorganizational agreements is interest-
motivated.  
 
On the other hand, interdependencies may also provide a basis for interorganizational 
competition, creating obstacles to coordination. Article II shows that when organizations must 
depend on the same resources, organizational desires to reduce uncertainty and protect their 
autonomy induced by the need to ensure organizational survival may create barriers to 
coordination. The commercialization of OSER services in the Russian system has established 
incentives for non-cooperative behaviour among response providers in the Murmansk region. 
Seeking to protect autonomy in a situation where there is little funding and federal policies 
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have numerous shortcomings, response organizations look for additional sources of income 
and therefore compete for resources and clients. By contrast, the findings regarding the 
Norwegian OSER system clearly show that there is no competition among actors. There, the 
responsibilities of the key actors are clearly delineated and their mandates are defined by the 
Pollution Control Act of 1981 and by state policy. The precision of the national policy on 
OSER in Norway does not allow for disputes among the actors involved.  
 
5.2.3. Structural configurations 
 
The peculiarities and dissimilarities of the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems, as shown 
in our discussion of the empirical findings, are reflected in the structural configurations of the 
systems. Compared to the Russian system, the structure of the Norwegian OSER system is 
more consistent and stable. Although the system changes its configuration from a more 
complex (contingency bureaucracy) configuration towards a more simple one, variations 
between the structure in the steady-state mode and the emergency mode of operation are 
minor. In Norway, where the national policy is consistent and where a single authority, the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration, is responsible for the OSER system, it is easier to 
maintain continuity in structure. In the Russian case, we find a larger gap between the 
structural configuration of the OSER system in the steady-state and emergency modes, with a 
distinct shift from the contingency bureaucracy structure towards a simplified structure of 
crisis organization. 
 
Both the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems have strong operating cores consisting of 
multiple components. However, the complexity of the operating core is not the issue: what is 
important is whether and how these components are linked with each other. In the Norwegian 
case, the private, municipal, and governmental contingencies together compose an integrated 
national system. By contrast, in the Russian system the sea and land territory sectors are 
disintegrated. This is particularly significant in the steady-state mode, whereas in an 
emergency situation the two sectors are united under the auspices of the Emergency 
Commission. In addition we have noted inter-sector competition over turf at the regional level 




These structural configurations are the outcomes of national approaches and policymaking in 
the sphere of OSER. The Norwegian and Russian systems are based on different policy 
approaches and regulatory frameworks in terms of unity. The Norwegian OSER system is 
backed up by a clearly formulated, unified state policy: the Russian system is not. This has 
affected the organizational process, interorganizational coordination in particular. In the 
Norwegian system, there is no rivalry or competition among the actors, unlike the case in the 
Russian system. This is ultimately the result of Norway‟s unified state policy and the 
socialization of actors into the national duty system. The impact of the policy framework on 
the organizational structure of an OESR system underscores the importance of a well-
developed and preferably integrated state policy as regards OSER. 
 
From on the discussion above, we may conclude that whether an OSER system is operating in 
the steady-state or in the emergency mode is the main factor that determines the 
organizational structure of the system. My findings show that the shift from the steady-state to 
the emergency mode leads to a simplification in the organizational structure of the OSER 
systems which is – as the theory states – a characteristic of crisis organization (Mintzberg, 
1983, pp. 157‒158). In the emergency mode of operation, characteristics that are defined by 
the scope of the incident play a crucial role, determining the complexity of the organizational 
structure of the OSER system involved. The larger the scale of an emergency, the larger the 
number of the actors involved in the operation is and thus the more complex the 
organizational structure becomes. On the other hand, the degree of the structural changes 
brought about by the shift in mode of operation may be substantially limited by the stability in 
organizational structure provided by a consistent national OSER policy. As we have seen, the 
structural configuration of the Norwegian OSER system changes only partially when it shifts 
from the steady-state to the emergency mode.  
 
The mode of operation is thus a factor that determines the organizational structure of an 
OSER system. But why does this change actually occur? Environmental instability entails 
adaptation problems for an OSER system, that is, for a rigid machine-bureaucracy structure. 
Machine bureaucracies are best suited for stable environments because they are designed for 
specific, predetermined missions (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 186). An emergency situation brings 
instability and uncertainty – conditions for which the command and control approach is ill-
suited. In these circumstances a machine bureaucracy such as an OSER system needs to 
compensate for its „shortcomings‟ by simplifying its structure. In other words, the 
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fundamental change in the organizational structure of an OSER system is provided by 
changes in the system‟s environment. However, this theoretical argument is, to a certain 
degree, in contradiction with our empirical findings – especially those regarding the 
Norwegian OSER system, where the structure remains relatively stable and we can note a pull 
towards formalization of procedures in an emergency situation.  
 
Although the configurations in figure 5 are similar to the ideal models discussed by Mintzberg 
(1983), analysis of the empirical evidence suggests that the pulls experienced by the OSER 
systems are not unequivocal (see previous discussion and table 7). As most organizations 
experience all five of the pulls under different circumstances, this is not unexpected 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p. 153). My objective was to simplify complex organizational reality in 
order to illustrate which pulls and structural configurations are favoured under particular 
conditions. In general terms, we may say that the pulls experienced by the OSER systems 
support the theoretical propositions discussed in section 2.2, with the contingency 
bureaucracy configuration (as a type of machine bureaucracy) reflecting the OSER system in 
the steady-state mode, whereas the crisis organization (as a type of simple structure) is typical 
of the emergency mode (see table 7).  
 
 
Directions of pulls  




strategic apex  
(machine bureaucracy/simple structure) 
strategic apex and 






strategic apex  
(machine bureaucracy/simple structure) 
middle line and 
operating core (divisionalized 
form/professional bureaucracy) 
 
Table 7. Pulls provided by the mode of operation in the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems  
 
The fact that the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems adjust their configurations in 
accordance with the demands of the external environment should be related to the issue of 
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system effectiveness. If „the successful organization designs its structure to match the 
situation‟ (Mintzberg, 1983, p, 122), the fact of appropriate change in the structural 
configuration of the OSER system will contribute to their effective performance. Yet, 
regarding structural effectiveness, we must consider not only whether the structure fits its 
situational factors, but whether internal consistency is achieved among the design parameters 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p, 122). And here the Norwegian OSER system clearly has greater 
potential for successful performance than the Russian one, due to its greater internal stability.   
 
 
5.3. Effectiveness of the OSER systems 
 
In this section, I summarize my findings on the effectiveness of the Norwegian and Russian 
OSER systems. The effectiveness of the Norwegian‒Russian OSR regime is discussed in 
detail in article IV and the findings are presented in section 4.2.4. I therefore do not go into 
further detail on the subject here. 
 
Viewing an OSER system as a regime, I use the indicators applied in article IV (outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts) to gauge the effectiveness of the national OSER systems
8
. Regime 
outputs involve measures employed to activate the paper arrangements of a regime into 
practical procedures; outcomes involve behavioural changes caused by the implementation of 
the regime (Miles et al. 2002, p. 6) including compliance (Young, 2002, p. 74); while the 
impacts of a regime concern its problem-solving capacity (Young, 2004, p. 12) or the ability 
to achieve its purpose (Underdal, 2004, p. 27). 
 
As regards outputs, the national OSER regime in Russia is based on a regulatory framework 
that suffers from substantial shortcomings. OSER activities in Russian are governed by a 
number of partial and at time contradictory laws: the situation is also the result of the lack of 
consolidated state policy in the environmental sector (Ivanova, 2011). Among the resultant 
negative consequences for interorganizational coordination is competition among the 
response providers in the wake of commercialization of OSER services (Ivanova and Sydnes, 
2010). The question of the problem-solving capacity of the Russian OSER system, and not 
least how the coordination mechanism would perform in a large-scale emergency, remains an 
hypothetical issue, as the system has never been involved such major emergency operation.  
                                                 
8




According to Russian informants, „it is difficult to say how it [the system] will work out in a 
real-life situation, only the incident will show‟; „[s]o far there have been no such precedents. 
Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate the existing [coordination] system, whether positively 
nor negatively. One can only guess at the way it will look‟ (informants, article II). Most 
informants agreed that the system would function effectively (article II). As one Russian 
informant noted, „there are several response providers in the region that can actually do 
something, those will come and do their job‟ (informant, article II). The high level of 
professionalism among regional response providers was also mentioned by the Norwegian 
partners (article IV). In addition, the national and bilateral Norwegian‒Russian training 
exercises indicate that the system should perform effectively (article II, IV). On the other 
hand, some informants – both Russian (article I) and Norwegian (article IV) – have expressed 
doubts and scepticism. They cite organizational and legislative inadequacies, insufficient 
technical capacity due to lack of funding, and lack of response-support functions like oil spill 
monitoring and tracking.   
 
In contrast, the Norwegian OSER system emerges as an active system. As shown in article III, 
as regards outputs the Norwegian regime is based on series of principles reflected in a clear-
cut national policy on OSER activity. In consequence, the system appears as a „well-oiled 
machine‟ where each element is aware of its function and all elements agree on how the 
„machine‟ is to perform. As one Norwegian informant commented, „[a]s an operative system 
there is little disagreement on how the system should work. This should not be a problem to 
establish a national command system. We are a small country, we have to cooperate and 
agree‟ (informant, article III). As the ability of the system to perform effectively in the case of 
an incident there is strong agreement among the informants. O. K. Bjerkemo, a senior official 
in the Norwegian OSER system, has concluded that Norway is prepared „but there are always 
possibilities for improvement‟ (Bjerkemo, 2010). The evaluation reports of the recent 
incidents (eg. the Full City
9
 operation) and the Norwegian informants themselves agree there 
are various issues to be deal with. Similarly, improvement of interorganizational coordination 
is set as a priority for further development of the system. Current initiatives in the process 
indicate the development of even further detailed formal structures and coordination 
                                                 
9
 On July 31 2009 the Panama-registered bulk carrier MV Full City run aground at Såstein, Telemark county, 
during a storm. The grounding caused a spill of approximately 300 tons of crude oil. The clean-up operation was 
led by the Coastal Administration and received considerable attention in the media.  
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procedures. Regarding the technical aspects, there is wide agreement on the need to increase 
capacity in the northern areas in order to be able to deal with the problems of on-going and 
projected petroleum development. Article III presents evidence that considerable efforts have 
been undertaken by the Norwegian authorities in recent years to strengthen OSER 
preparedness, in particular in the High North.  
 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
 
So far, I have summarized and discussed key aspects of the Norwegian and Russian OSER 
systems. I have highlighted the main structural characteristics, discussed how these are 
determined, and deliberated on main points of interorganizational coordination and 
interdependence in the OSER systems. I wind up the discussion in the following chapter, 
which presents the main overall conclusions and formulates answers to the research questions 





















6.1. Main conclusions 
 
Let us return to the four research questions. My first question inquired into the basic 
characteristics and determinants of an OSER system’s organizational structure. As an 
organizational system an OSER system is first and foremost „a set of [organizations] standing 
in interaction‟ (von Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 39). Mintzberg (1983) describes an OSER system as 
a complex setting consisting of five interacting core components (strategic apex, middle line, 
operating core, technostructure, and support staff). Integrity and cohesion are crucial, as 
disruption may affect the effectiveness of system performance. The key characteristic of an 
OSER system is its highly adaptable and contingent nature, with a dual structure that is a 
function of the system‟s mode of operation. The complexity of the structure hinges on the 
extent of each specific incident and the character of the tasks the system must deal with.  
 
I conclude that the mode of operation is a major determinant of the organizational structure of 
an OSER system. A shift from the steady-state to the emergency mode of operation entails a 
change in structural configuration – from a more complex towards more simplified 
bureaucratic organizational structure. The reason is the change of organizational environment, 
from stable towards more dynamic. In addition, my empirical findings indicate that national 
policy on OSER activities may substantially affect the structure of such a system.   
 
The second and third research questions concerned the nature of the relationship between the 
formal and informal mechanisms of interorganizational coordination, and how it provides for 
effective functioning of an OSER system. Overall, the analytical approaches to the study of 
interorganizational coordination and interdependence proved applicable for studying OSER 
systems. Inquiry into the coordination mechanisms that are at play in the Norwegian and 
Russian OSER systems allows me to conclude that formal and informal mechanism are 
intertwined parts of the process of interorganizational coordination. I argue that formal and 
informal mechanisms of interorganizational coordination provide for the effective functioning 
of an OSER system through their simultaneous interplay. If this interplay is synergetic, 




My findings indicate the primary nature of the formal mechanisms as the means of 
interorganizational coordination. However, we have also seen strong evidence of the 
importance of informal coordination in OSER systems, so informal procedures should not be 
underestimated. The findings on the importance of informal mechanisms of coordination can 
be seen in connection with social science disaster studies comparing the traditional command 
and control and the problem-solving models for organizing emergency response. Within this 
debate the command and control approach has been criticized for its lack of flexibility (Dynes 
and Quarantelli, 1976; Britton, 1989, p. 28; Harrald et al., 1992, p. 214; Walker et al., 1994, p. 
42; Dynes, 1994; Neal and Phillips, 1995, p. 335; Weller, 1997). The findings of this study 
support the argument that approaches to the organization of OSER activity should consider 
the importance of informal forms of coordination, in addition to formal mechanisms, as 
informal forms may be able to compensate for shortcomings in the formal procedures and 
facilitate effectiveness of OSER systems (see Walker et al., 1994).  
 
This argument is supported by the general propositions of organizational theory. Similarly, 
contingency theory argues that the form of organizational structure requires a close fit to the 
kinds of its tasks or the environment (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 122). The more variable and 
unpredictable the environment, the more organic the structure must be, and  the organization 
will need to rely on more flexible, less formal coordinating mechanisms  (Mintzberg, 1983, 
pp. 137‒138). In particular, „disaster management is best served by a modified simplified 
bureaucratic structure, which is more organic, encourages innovation and adaptive behaviour, 
is flexible and focuses on end products rather than on functional prerequisites‟ (Mintzberg 
1979, cited in Britton, 1989, p. 10). 
 
Finally, I had asked: How do the patterns of interdependence among organizations in OSER 
systems affect interorganizational coordination? The findings indicate that OSER is to a very 
high degree a multi-party activity, and interdependence is inherent in OSER systems. This 
study has shown that interdependence among the organizations involved in an OSER system 
has a twofold effect on interorganizational coordination: it may both facilitate and hamper it. 
We have seen that inconsistencies in national policy on OSER may create the preconditions 
for competitive interdependence among the organizations within an OSER system.  
 
Though this study provides strong evidence that interdependence is inherent in OSER 
systems, that does not necessarily imply that both competitive and facilitative 
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interdependence are at play. In Russia, inconsistencies in federal policy on OSER have 
created preconditions for competition between organizations – in other words, they have 
facilitated competitive interdependence. In contrast, we found no competition among actors in 
Norway, where the national OSER system is based on a clearly formulated policy that 
provides no room for disputes among the actors. This would indicate that, by eliminating gaps 
or overlaps in the regulatory framework, policymakers can substantially reduce the 
preconditions for competitive interdependence. And such interdependence is of course 
counterproductive, as it hampers interorganizational coordination and thereby the 
effectiveness of an OSER system.  
 
In a more demanding operational situation, interdependence among the participating 
organizations in an OSER system increases, also becoming more selective, depending on the 
phase of the incident in question. Not all organizations connected to an OSER system on a 
daily basis participate in emergency response work. In addition, different actors may be 
involved at different stages of an acute situation. These may establish patterns of 
interdependence in an emergency situation that are different from those in the steady-state 




This thesis has contributed to the studies of collective organizational behaviour and 
organizational relations in disaster situations, by providing new information and insights on 
interorganizational coordination in OSER systems. In focus have been the OSER systems in 
Norway and the Murmansk region of Northwest Russia. The main contribution of this study 
lies in its empirical findings. Academic knowledge on the Norwegian is scarce, especially as 
regards the Russian OSER system and the bilateral Norwegian–Russian OSR cooperation. 
Each of the four articles in the thesis has contributed new knowledge on oil spill emergency 
preparedness in the Barents Sea.  
 
As to the theory contributions of the study, they are somewhat more modest. This thesis has 
shown that analytical approaches to interorganizational coordination can be applied to the 
study of coordination in the OSER systems. In particular, it is fruitful to apply Mintzberg‟s 
analytical approach to understanding organizational structure to the analysis of an OSER 
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system, i.e. an interorganizational setting. This approach has made it possible to shed light on 
the structural specifics and challenges of the Norwegian and Russian OSER systems. In 
addition, I have demonstrated graphically how and why an OSER system undertakes a 
transition from one structure to another. That similar structural components play key roles in 
the steady-state and the emergency modes of operation in both the Norwegian and the Russian 
OSER systems would indicate that the findings of this study may hold true for other OSER 
systems as well. This implies that Mintzberg‟s analytical approach may be applied to the 
analysis of OSER systems or perhaps also to other complex organizational settings.  
 
The findings of the study indicate the need for caution in developing a policy framework for 
OSER activities. There may be good reasons to disintegrate OSER activities when 
responsibility is placed under several authorities. This may, however, also entail a range of 
negative implications for the effective functioning of the OSER system.  
 
6.3. Issues for further research 
 
This study was motivated by increased concern over the status of oil spill emergency 
preparedness in view of current and projected large-scale petroleum developments in the High 
North. Such developments may bring considerable socio-economic benefits, but can also 
entail substantial costs if a major accident should occur. Oil spill emergency preparedness and 
response remain an important research topic not only for scientific but also for societal needs.  
 
This study has concentrated on the system level of analysis. I suggest that further research 
should proceed with the examination of the processes within the OSER systems. 
Organizational culture has not been in focus in this study. The importance of culture has been 
underlined in article II, III and IV, but has not been discussed in detail. Empirical findings 
indicate that the organizational culture within both the Norwegian and the Russian OSER 
systems is similar, based on mutual readiness to help one another, which in turn stems from 
the conviction that success depends on the efforts of all. However, in the Norwegian system 
this culture is established by the state, whereas in the Russian system it is very much created 
by the participants themselves through the sense of interdependence. Closer study of these 
issues is needed to understand how organizational culture is established in OSER systems and 




My empirical findings indicate that cooperation and the ministerial/agency level are two 
loosely coupled processes, in Norway and Russia alike. However, I have not delved into the 
question of why this is so. The theoretical propositions suggest that relationships between 
agencies are driven by different logics of interdependence, according to the level at which 
they are established. This can affect the outcomes of cooperation (Thomas, 2003). Analysis of 
the bilateral Norwegian‒Russian cooperation on OSR is a topic that merits further 
examination.   
 
Recent communication with some of my Russian informants has indicated that new 
environmental legislation and new regulations on OSER activities are to be adopted soon. The 
process has been slow, and, as commented by one informant, little is likely to change in the 
nearest future due to the absence of preconditions. All the same, the new legislation may add 
momentum, because the emphasis is somewhat different from that of current legislation. 
Therefore, a follow-up study of the Russian OSER system will be needed, to see whether and 
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Interview date Dictaphone / notes
Governmental 
authorities
Committee of Nature Use and Ecology of the Murmansk region 2
high (for 
both)
Aug 2007, Oct 2008 Dictaphone
Department of the Federal Supervisory Natural Resources Management 
Service (Rosprirodnadzor) in the North-West federal district. Department 
for Surveillance at sea (Murmansk region)
1 high Oct 2008, May 2010 Dictaphone
The Main Department of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia in the 
Murmansk region
1 high Oct 2008, May 2010 Notes
Murmansk Basin Emergency Rescue and Salvage Department (MBERSD) 2
high (for 
both)




“NavEcoService” Ltd. 1 high
Aug 2007, Oct 2008, Oct 2009, 
May 2010
Dictaphone
Murmansk Marine Biological Institute 1 high Oct 2008 Dictaphone
Central Marine Research and Design Institute Ltd. (CNIIMF) 1 high Oct 2008 Dictaphone
WWW-Russia Barents Sea Regional Office 1 middle Oct 2008 Dictaphone
Bellona-Murmansk 1 middle Oct 2008, Oct 2010 Dictaphone
Environmental Harmony Evolution Fund 1 high Aug 2007, Oct 2008 Dictaphone
Oil Reloading Complex "Belokamenka" (oil operator) 1 high Oct 2008 Dictaphone
OOO Ramboll Barents 1 middle Dec 2010 Dictaphone (Skype)
Akvaplan-niva AS (research and consultancy) 1 high Nov 2010 Dictaphone




Ministry of the Environment 1 high July 2010 Dictaphone
Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs 3
high (for 
all)
Dec 2009; May, June 2011
1,2 Notes; 3 Notes 
(Phone)
Climate and Pollution Agency (Klif) 2
middle and 
high
July 2010; Feb 2011 Notes (Phone)
Municipal 
authorities
Tromsø municipality 1 high Jan 2011 Dictaphone
Response 
organizations
Norwegian Coastal Administration 3
high (for 
all)































































Annex II: Interview questions  
 
I. Questions to the Russian informants 
General: 
1. How is the oil spill emergency response system organized in Russia? 
2. Which authority is responsible for the establishment of the OSER system in Russia?  
3. What are the core tasks of your agency?  
4. What is the official procedure in a situation of oil spill emergency? Who is responsible 
for what?   
 
On coordination: 
5. What other organizations do you coordinate / cooperate with (what kind of 
organizations are those)? Is this a mandatory coordination established by law, or is it 
initiated by the organizations themselves (what is the driving force in this 
coordination)?  
6. How far does the need to coordinate activity with others affect the performance of 
your organization? To what extent is it important for the success of your organization?  
7. Do you encounter any problems or difficulties in working with other organizations 
(e.g. lack of understanding, lack of mutual interests)? 
8. Which factors do you think influence (both positively and negatively) the interaction 
between your organization and other organizations (e.g. different organizational goals, 
different ways of operating, etc.)? 
9. Is there any informal coordination? 
 
On the risks of oil spills 
10. What in your opinion are the greatest sources of danger (the main reasons for 
emergencies) related to the possibility of oil spill accidents, both potentially and at 
present?  
11. What percentage of emergencies concern oil spills during transport? 
12. How frequent are incidents related to oil spills? 
13. What measures for preventing oil spills are being taken in the Murmansk region? 
14. (to one of the informants) During our previous conversation you mentioned that far 
too little attention is paid to land territory, all the focus is on sea. Can we talk more 
about it? Who pays little attention? Why? Do they not realize the risks? Has anything 
changed since the last time?  
15. (to one of the informants) Your organization provides oil spill response at sea. How 
would you evaluate the overall priorities: sea/land territory? 
 
On capacity (to organizations taking part in emergency response operations): 
16. How well prepared is your organization in terms of capacity (equipment, specialists)? 
Can you manage to meet the time requirements of 4 to 6 hours? What is the maximum 
size of an oil spill you are prepared to deal with?  
17. Do you face any difficulties in conducting oil spill response operations? If yes, what 
kind of problems and how do you solve them?  







19. Do you think that the contingency plans existing today assist in getting prepared for 
emergency situations?  
20. Do the plans provide for more effective response operations? 
21. How often are the plans revised? 
22. How is the system of state ecological monitoring organized? 
 
Personal questions 
23. What do you believe are the underlying principles upon which the overall oil spill 
emergency response system in Russia is built? Who do you think are the key actors in 
the process? What does the Russian OSER system aim at? 
24. What in your opinion are the key components of an effective OSER? 
25. What are the root causes of spills? How would you estimate the role of human factors 
as a cause of accidents? 
26. What do you think is required to reduce the probability of future accidents? 
27. Do you believe that increased oil transport will lead to increased risks of oil pollution?  
28. Can you comment on the legislation currently governing the sphere of OSER in 
Russia? Do you see any issues where improvement is needed? 
29. Why do you think companies sometimes choose to conceal information about oil 
spills? 
30. There are quite a few organizations that are involved in providing oil spill prevention 
and emergency response in the region. Do you think they all work like one whole 
system aiming to provide adequate measures to protect people and the environment 
from harmful consequences of the oil spill accidents? Do you see any issues that 
require special attention? 
31. Do you observe any duplication of functions among the authorities?  
32. What do you think of the system of reimbursement for environmental damage is in 
Russia?  
33. What, in your opinion, is the level of compliance among companies?  
34. What liabilities for accidents have the companies that are engaged in oil operations?  
35. If you encounter a situation of avoidance in complying with current legislation how do 
you usually deal with it? 
36. According to the law, companies are subjected to various types of responsibility 
(disciplinary, criminal, civilian). To what extent does the law function in real life?  
37. Are the compensation payments required from companies for environmental damage 
adequate as regards the real estimates of the damage? 
38. What is your opinion regarding the effectiveness of the oil spill emergency response 
system in the Murmansk region? Could you comment on any matters that require 
special attention?  
 
II. Questions to the Norwegian informants 
Group 1 : The national system of oil spill emergency preparedness and response in Norway 
1. When was the system of oil spill emergency preparedness and response established in 
Norway?  
 what was the background for this? 
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2. Who are the main actors in the Norwegian system of oil spill emergency preparedness 
and response at the national level? 
 which organizations are the main actors? 
 what are their responsibilities? 
 how are all the actors united into one system? 
3. What is your opinion on the design of the system? 
 does the design of the system work well? 
4. Is there anything special regarding the system of oil spill emergency preparedness and 
response in the Barents Sea? 
 what means are available? 
 are these means sufficient? 
5. The capacity of the system has been criticized at all levels (state, municipal, and 
private) mainly with reference to old equipment (municipal) and inadequate 
preparedness (private). How would you comment on this? 
6. How would you evaluate the level of oil spill emergency preparedness in relation to 
projected developments in the petroleum sector in the Barents Sea and increased 
transport of oil from the Russian Arctic? 
 
Group 2 : Coordination between different actors within the Norwegian system of oil spill 
emergency preparedness and response 
1. What other organizations does the Coastal Administration coordinate / cooperate with  
 on a daily basis? 
 routinely? 
 in an emergency situation? 
2. What are the reasons or needs for the coordination?  
3. How is the coordination formally established (meetings, forums, procedures)? 
 on a daily basis? 
 in an emergency situation? 
4. In what situation does such coordination take place? 
5. Do you have any informal contacts with other organizations?  
 what are they? 
 what are the reasons? 
 in what situations? 
6. Have you ever experienced challenges when coordinating with other organizations 
 on a daily basis? 
 in an emergency situation? 
7. Which factors do you think can improve coordination? 
8. Which factors can cause potential coordination problems? 
9. How does the system work in case of an accident? 
 what are the responsibilities of different actors? 
 how does the procedure work? 
 
Group 3 : Risks of oil spills 
1. What are the most obvious risks as regards accidental oil spills? 
2. What measures are taken in Norway to mitigate  the risks of accidental oil spills? 
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3. What is your opinion regarding the perception of various risks among different 
actors within the Norwegian system of oil spill emergency preparedness and 
response? 
 
Group 4 : Contingency planning in Norway 
1. What kinds of contingency plans exist in Norway? 
2. What is the function of contingency plans? 
3. Which authority is responsible for making the plans? 
4. How often are the plans revised? 
5. How are the various contingency plans coordinated? 
6. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the contingency plans? 
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